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Abstract 
 
 Many have predicted that the U.S. hospital industry will become increasingly 
consolidated in the coming years, as independent hospitals join large multihospital systems.   
Independent hospitals joining systems often expect system membership to result in benefits 
including improvements in the quality of care provided, the efficiency of hospital operations and 
the hospital's access to capital to fund investment.  Prior research has examined the effects of 
hospital system membership on quality and efficiency but has failed to examine how system 
membership affects hospitals’ access to capital.  The three studies that make up this dissertation 
address this gap in the literature by exploring the effects of system membership on a hospital’s 
internal capital (cash) management, its external capital (debt) management and its capital 
investment behavior.  All three studies estimate the effects of system membership using a 
difference in differences study design and a sample of independent hospitals acquired by 
multihospital system between 1997 and 2008.  Financial data come from hospitals’ Medicare 
Cost Reports. 
 The first study examines the effects of system membership on not-for-profit hospitals’ 
cash holdings.  This study tests the possibility that system membership enables not-for-profit 
hospitals to reduce the size of these reserves and, in doing so, frees up internal cash to fund real 
investment.  The results suggest that system membership does not cause large reductions in 
acquired hospital cash balances. 
x 
 
 The second study explores the effects of system membership on not-for-profit hospitals’ 
ability to access debt markets.  The results show that low-leverage acquired hospitals increase 
debt holdings more than a set of control hospitals identified through propensity score matching.  
These results are consistent with the idea that some independent hospitals have challenges 
accessing debt capital and that system membership helps affected hospitals overcome these 
challenges. 
 The final paper looks at the capital investment behavior of acquired hospitals as a way of 
determining whether or not system membership improves acquired hospitals’ access to capital.  
Ordinary least squares regression estimates suggest that acquired hospitals experience a 
temporary increase in capital investment in the years immediately following acquisition.  
However, this increase is largest for hospitals that have relatively newer physical plants in the 
pre-acquisition period. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 One of the most prominent changes in the hospital industry in the past 30 years has been 
the increase in the proportion of hospitals operating as part of a multihospital system.  Currently 
over 60% of hospitals are members of a multihospital system. (Health Forum, 2013)    Merger 
and acquisition activity within the hospital industry has risen since 2009 and many believe the 
industry is preparing for further consolidation. (PWC, 2013; Wong-Hammond & Damon, 2013)  
Health services researchers have devoted significant effort to studying the effects of 
consolidation within the hospital industry.  However, much of this effort has addressed 
consolidation in the form of single-market hospital mergers or hospital conversions from not-for-
profit (NFP) to investor ownership rather than the effects of independent hospitals joining 
systems. (Cuellar & Gertler, 2003)  Moreover, the research that has addressed the effects of 
system membership focuses on the effects of system membership on quality outcomes (Madison, 
2004), hospital prices (Melnick & Keeler, 2007), or operational efficiency (Dranove, Durkac, & 
Shanley, 1996; Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003).  While these are all important outcomes, system 
membership may also cause changes in the financial management of hospitals.  In particular, 
many hospitals joining systems claim that they expect system membership to improve their 
access to capital.  However, the effects of system membership on a hospital’s ability to access 
financial capital have received little attention from researchers. 
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Now more than ever hospitals managers are focusing on access to capital and ways to 
improve financial management practice.  In the past 20 years financial management has become 
a much larger part of hospital managers’ responsibilities.  Prior to 1983 hospital administrators 
bore little financial or operational risk because Medicare and many other payers reimbursed 
hospitals for the full cost of providing services and making capital investments.  However, cost-
based reimbursement for hospital services ended in 1983 and cost-based reimbursement for 
capital expenses was phased out between 1992 and 2002.  As a result hospitals administrators 
became responsible for managing the risk associated with capital investments.  Because of these 
changes, securing financing has become challenging for many hospitals.  Some hospitals are not 
generating sufficient internal capital to fund important projects (HFMA and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004) and many hospitals face declining bond ratings and difficulty 
accessing debt markets. (American Hospital Association, 2013b; HFMA and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003)  Not-for-profit hospitals have faced the greatest barriers to 
capital access because these hospitals do not have access to equity markets and equity from 
philanthropic donations is negligible for most hospitals. (Smith, Wheeler, Rivenson, & Reiter, 
2000)  Challenging debt market conditions and limited access to equity financing make access to 
capital a problem for many NFP hospitals.    
While some hospitals face limited access to capital, the hospital industry as a whole has 
experienced relatively high demand for investment to replace aging facilities, expand specialty 
services and to pursue investments in health information technology. (American Hospital 
Association, 2013a; Bazzoli, Gerland, & May, 2006; HFMA and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004)  
Independent NFP hospitals that have struggled to gain access to capital have been advised by 
hospital managers, consultants and the trade press to consider joining multihospital systems. 
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(Ault, Childs, Wainright, & Young, 2011; Cali & Quinn, 2013; Carlson & Galloro, 2009; Dunn, 
2013; Galloro & Tieman, 2002; Kaufman Hall and Associates, Inc., 2010)  Unfortunately, little 
is known about whether multihospital system membership does improve access to capital and, if 
so, how this occurs.   
 
Conceptual justifications for differences in the cost of capital 
Despite widespread belief that system membership can improve access to capital, 
theoretical justifications for why a hospital’s cost of capital should decline when it joins a system 
are rare.  Still, financial theory and some prior work suggest a few reasons internal and external 
capital may be more available to system hospitals than to independent hospitals.  For NFP 
hospitals, internal capital comes primarily from stores of cash and financial investments.  These 
accounts are held not only to fund investment in physical assets, but also to fund transactions and 
as a precaution against unexpected cash shortfalls. (Rivenson, Reiter, Wheeler, & Smith, 2011)  
System membership may increase available internal capital by “freeing up” some cash held for 
precautionary or transaction purposes to be used for investment.  This could occur if system 
membership allowed a hospital to lower the optimal level of cash on hand.  Lower optimal levels 
of cash holdings would result if system membership allowed hospitals to take advantage of 
economies of scale in cash management or to reduce the volatility of cash flows. (Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999)     
System membership can also affect access to NFP hospitals’ primary source of external 
capital—debt markets.  Wedig et al (1998) observe that the cost of capital for NFP hospitals 
increases with leverage because NFP hospitals have difficulty raising equity capital and 
managers are averse to the risks associated with increased leverage.  Wedig et al assert that the 
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increase in the cost of capital is likely to occur at lower leverage for independent hospitals than 
system-affiliated hospitals.  The authors justify their claim, reasoning that because hospital 
systems can spread risk across all of the system’s hospitals, those hospitals should be able to take 
on more debt that independent hospitals.  System hospitals may also borrow larger amounts than 
independent hospitals and in doing so, reduce the proportional transactions costs of borrowing.  
System hospitals may also have more of the managerial expertise required to access debt markets 
than independent hospitals.  
System membership may change an independent hospital’s cost of capital by improving 
access to external debt markets, by freeing up internal cash reserves, or through other changes in 
financial management.  System membership could affect the management of internal and 
external capital separately as described above.  However, the effects of system membership on 
the two kinds of capital could also be related.  For instance, improved access to debt markets 
may reduce a hospital’s optimal level of cash holdings, freeing some cash for investment.   
 
Effects of differing costs of capital 
Regardless of the mechanism by which a change in the cost of capital occurs, the result 
should be an increase in the amount of capital expenditure a hospital undertakes.  Accepting the 
modest assumption that the returns on a hospital’s capital investment opportunities are declining 
as total investment increases, a reduction in a hospital’s cost of capital should cause the hospital 
to pursue additional capital investment since more projects will offer returns sufficient to 
compensate for the reduced cost of borrowed capital.  It is important to note, however, that 
system membership is likely to affect other factors related to capital expenditures, either by 
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creating new investment opportunities or by changing the expected cash flows associated with 
existing opportunities.  Changes in capital investment associated with system membership could 
be driven by a changing cost of capital or by these changes in factors affecting investment 
demand. 
 
Empirical evidence on system membership and the cost of capital 
 There is relatively little research that examines differences in access to capital between 
system-affiliated and independent hospitals directly.  Two exceptions include Calem and Rizzo 
(1995) and Sloan et al (1988).  The first paper finds evidence that capital investment is more 
sensitive to cash flow for independent hospitals than for system hospitals, suggesting that system 
hospitals are better able to raise external financing than independent hospitals.  However, 
differences in investment-cash flow sensitivity could also be the result of cash management 
policies that differ between independent and system-affiliated hospitals.  Results from the Sloan 
et al (1988) paper suggest that independent and system-affiliated hospitals do not differ in their 
ability to attract external capital.  They compare interest rates on debt issued by independent 
hospitals and hospital systems and find only minor differences in the cost of debt to each type of 
NFP hospital.  However, these results are limited in that they are not conditional on factors 
affecting creditworthiness and they are based on hospitals that successfully issued debt.  The 
results may not be representative if independent hospitals are more likely to be denied credit or 
to be offered interest rates that are so high they forgo a debt issue.  Both studies are of limited 
generalizability because they rely on data from before the end of cost-based reimbursement for 
capital. 
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In addition to research that directly examines the effect of system membership on the cost 
of capital, several studies examine debt management, cash management and capital investing 
practices.  If differences in these financial management practices helped system hospitals to 
enjoy improved access to capital, I would expect to see system hospitals holding less cash and 
greater amounts of debt than independent hospitals, while investing more in capital expenditures 
than independent hospitals.  Previous research suggests that systems as a whole hold less cash 
than independent hospitals and that system-affiliated hospitals hold less cash than independent 
hospitals (McCue, Thompson, & Dodd-McCue, 2000; Rivenson et al., 2011).  Debt levels among 
system hospitals are larger than those among independent hospitals, even after controlling for 
many factors that affect a hospital’s leverage. (Gentry, 2002; Wedig et al., 1998)  However, prior 
research has not found an association between system-affiliation and higher capital spending 
levels.  (Kim & McCue, 2008; Reiter, 2004)  Thus there is some evidence that financial 
management of internal and external capital differs between system-affiliated and independent 
hospitals, but there is no evidence that these differences enable system hospitals to enjoy higher 
levels of capital expenditures.  It is important to note that these studies use cross sectional 
observations and the differences they detect could be effects of system membership or they could 
arise because hospital systems selectively acquire independent hospitals able to maintain lower 
cash balances and higher leverage.  Moreover, the studies of debt and capital investment are not 
primarily concerned with detecting differences in system and independent hospitals’ financial 
management and only include system membership as a constant control variable.  If the effects 
of system membership are complex or only occur for a subgroup of hospitals, the effect might 
not be captured using the models employed in these papers. 
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Scope of dissertation 
This dissertation will determine whether there are changes in the financial management 
practices of acquired hospitals that are consistent with the idea system membership can improve 
an independent hospital’s access to capital.  The dissertation will consist of three papers that 
examine changes in cash management, debt management and capital investment behavior.  These 
papers will answer the following questions: 
 
1. When an independent NFP hospital joins a multihospital system are there changes in the 
hospital’s cash holdings?   
2. Does leverage change for NFP hospitals that join systems.  In particular, do highly-
levered hospitals increase their debt holdings? 
3. Does the level of capital investment increase when an independent hospital joins a 
multihospital system.  If so, when do these changes occur relative to the time of 
acquisition? 
  
Chapter II will examine hospitals’ cash management practices.  Cash holdings are 
particularly important for NFP hospitals’ capital access because they fund capital expenditures 
directly and indirectly, as collateral used to insure future access to debt markets.  Independent 
NFP hospitals also hold large cash reserves.  If the factors that cause independent hospitals to 
hold large cash reserves change with system membership, optimal cash balances for acquired 
hospitals could decline.  Managers would be freed to use excess cash holdings to fund capital 
investment.    This paper will examine whether independent an hospital’s cash holdings decline 
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after the hospital joins a system, and whether these changes are consistent with a decline in 
optimal cash holdings that frees cash reserves for use funding capital investments. 
  Chapter III will examine management of a key source of external capital for NFP 
hospitals--debt.  Some prior work suggests that systems have better access to debt markets than 
independent hospitals.  This could be because hospital systems better understand how to interact 
with debt markets than independent hospitals or because the fixed transactions costs of 
borrowing make borrowing relatively cheaper for systems than for smaller, independent 
hospitals.  If system membership has these beneficial effects, acquired hospitals that are under-
levered should be able to increase their debt holdings while over-levered hospitals can maintain 
debt holdings.  This paper will examine changes in leverage for both low-levered and highly-
levered independent hospitals that join systems. 
 Chapter IV will examine how the level of capital investment changes for independent 
hospitals that join multihospital systems.  Prior research and the trade press suggest that 
independent hospitals can join multihospital systems to improve their access to capital.  If the 
availability or cost of capital declines we would expect hospitals to increase their levels of 
capital investment.  This paper will examine whether independent hospitals that join systems 
increase their capital expenditures. 
  
Sample 
Each paper uses a similar sample of acquired hospitals to examine the effects of system 
membership.  Unfortunately, there is not a comprehensive dataset of hospital transactions 
available and identifying independent hospitals that joined systems is challenging.  To overcome 
this challenge a two-step procedure was used to identify independent hospitals that joined 
9 
 
systems.  First, data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey for the years 
1996-2009 were analyzed to identify changes in a hospital’s system status.  Cases were identified 
in which a hospital was not classified as the member of a hospital system, then, in the next year, 
the hospital was classified as a system member.  This yielded a list of 519 potential transactions 
in which an independent hospital appeared to join a system.  However, in researching some of 
these transactions it became apparent that a system membership change did not occur as 
indicated by the AHA data.  To resolve this, three other sources of information on hospital 
transactions were consulted.  The first source is the annual list of hospital mergers and 
acquisitions published by Modern Healthcare.  The second source of information on hospital 
consolidation are the Hospital Acquisition Reports published by Irving Levin and Associates. If 
neither the Modern Healthcare lists nor the Hospital Acquisition reports contained a record of 
the transaction, the hospital’s webpage and online news sources were used to search for evidence 
a transaction had taken place.  If none of these attempts yielded confirmation that the transaction 
occurred the hospital was eliminated from the sample.  Hospitals without confirmed transactions 
were eliminated from the sample for several reasons.  First, some hospitals with unconfirmed 
transactions clearly listed a system affiliation on their webpages but did not offer information 
about the date on which they joined a system.  In these cases it was impossible to assign a system 
status to each hospital year since only the current system status was known.  In other cases, the 
hospital websites did not contain information about a system affiliation.  However, some 
hospitals with confirmed system affiliation do not prominently display their affiliation on their 
websites so the lack of information about system-affiliation is not adequate justification for 
classifying these hospitals as independent.  Hospitals that joined a multihospital system and then 
left the system a few years later were excluded from the sample as well.  These hospitals were 
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excluded because they may have experienced challenges integrating into the system or they may 
not have been affiliated with the system for long enough to experience improvements in access 
to capital.  The papers in this dissertation seek to determine whether system membership can 
improve capital access for acquired hospitals.  As a result, the sample includes hospitals most 
likely to have realized these improvements.  This is why hospitals that move in and out of 
systems during the study period are not included in the sample.  Future research will be needed 
to estimate how frequently acquired hospitals do experience improvements in access to capital.  
Ultimately this method identified 219 hospitals whose acquisitions could be confirmed.  The 
actual samples used in each paper are smaller because they are limited to subpopulations of 
acquired hospitals for which an effect is most likely. 
  
System vs. independent hospital motivations for acquisition 
 This dissertation focuses primarily on the motivation for independent hospitals to join 
multihospital systems.  In particular, each of the papers take steps to identify the sub-sample of 
acquired hospitals most likely to experience increases to access to capital.  However, it is 
important to acknowledge that acquiring systems have their own motivations for acquiring 
independent hospitals.  It is possible that some hospital systems acquire hospitals with the goal of 
helping to improve those hospitals’ access to capital, enabling the acquired hospital to make 
investments it could not otherwise make, and then sharing in the profits those investments create.  
However, more often systems are pursuing other motives through acquisition.  In some cases the 
acquiring system could be motivated by the desire to increase its market power.  In others the 
system may want to expand its geographic reach, to acquire a competitor or to acquire a hospital 
the system believes is poorly run which offers opportunities to improve efficiency and cash flow.   
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 Ideally, research on the relationship between hospitals and access to capital would 
develop measures to identify hospital systems most likely to improve acquired hospitals’ access 
to capital.  This dissertation makes an effort to include only hospital systems most likely to 
improve access to capital in acquired hospitals by eliminating hospital systems consisting of only 
one or two hospitals from the sample.  Hospitals acquired by these small systems are the least 
likely to see improvements in access to capital.  The AHA definition of system membership 
includes hospitals that are owned, leased or contract managed by a central organization   
Hospitals that entered systems only through contract management agreements are eliminated 
from the sample of acquired hospitals since contract management is not a form of system 
membership likely to lead to changes in access to capital.  Hospitals that enter systems through 
lease agreements would be unlikely to experience changes in access to capital if the term of the 
lease was short.  Most of the lease terms reported were longer than 20 years so hospitals that 
joined systems through lease agreements were included in the sample of acquired hospitals.  
However, restricting the sample of acquired hospitals based on system size and the form of 
system membership are only two of many possible system characteristics that could affect a 
system’s willingness and ability to improve an acquired hospital’s access to capital.  Future 
research in this area could use more sophisticated strategies for identifying systems likely to 
improve access to capital among the hospitals they acquire. 
 Despite the dissertation’s focus on characteristics of acquired hospitals (rather than 
acquiring systems) likely to lead to improvements in access to capital, the three papers that 
comprise this dissertation provide a fuller understanding of how system membership affects 
acquired hospitals’ management of internal and external capital, as well as hospitals’ capital 
investment decisions.  In doing so, these papers provide a better understanding of whether or not 
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system membership can improve an independent hospital’s access to capital.  The results will be 
of interest to hospital boards, hospital managers, and policy makers, all of whom need a clear 
understanding of the financing benefits associated with system membership. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Cash Reserves and System Membership:  Does System Membership Improve Not-For-
Profit Hospitals’ Access to Internal Capital by Reducing Optimal Cash Balances? 
 
 
Introduction 
 Hospitals are currently facing regulatory and market forces that make capital 
expenditures critical.    These include new investments in information technology systems 
needed to improve clinical quality, to take advantage of payer incentives to use this technology 
and increasingly to avoid financial penalties for failing to use this technology.  (American 
Hospital Association, 2013)  Capital investment has also been linked to the quality of clinical 
care hospitals provide (Levitt, 1994) and a hospital’s ability to compete with other hospitals in its 
market (Byrd & McCue, 2003).  However, as capital needs have increased many independent 
hospitals have found raising capital difficult.  (American Hospital Association, 2013; Carlson & 
Galloro, 2009)    In particular, many independent not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals claim they have 
difficulty finding funding for capital investment.  These hospitals maintain large stocks of 
financial assets that could easily be liquidated to fund capital investment needs (Gentry, 2002; 
Song & Reiter, 2010), but this course of action is seldom if ever recommended to hospital 
executives.  Instead, hospitals seeking access to capital are frequently advised by consultants and 
industry experts to join multihospital systems as a way to improve access to capital.  (Ault, 
Childs, Wainright, & Young, 2011; Janiga & Muller, 2013)   However, little is known about how 
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system membership affects a hospital’s ability to access capital markets and which 
characteristics of system membership are responsible for improving an acquired hospital’s access 
to capital.  This paper will examine the possibility that system membership improves access to 
capital by allowing independent hospital to hold fewer financial assets in reserve and to use a 
portion of their existing reserves for capital investment.  
Finance theory suggests that independent NFP hospitals have a unique set of 
organizational and financial market characteristics that lead them to hold large investments in 
financial assets rather than using these funds as a source of capital.  These financial assets 
include cash holdings as well as short-term investments in financial securities.  (Throughout the 
rest of the paper both of these categories of financial securities will collectively be referred to as 
“cash” because of their liquid nature.1)   It is possible that system membership alters these 
characteristics in ways that allow hospitals to reduce their cash balances.  As a result, acquisition 
by a system may allow some hospitals with large cash holdings to use some of their cash to fund 
real investment.  “Freeing up” cash and other financial assets in this way is one way that system 
membership could improve access to capital for acquired hospitals.  The amount of capital 
available from “freed up” internal cash reserves is potentially large because NFP hospitals hold 
large stores of financial assets.  From 1997-2006 NFP hospitals held an average of 21% of their 
assets in cash or financial investments while investor-owned hospitals held only 4% of their 
assets as cash or financial investments.  (Song & Reiter, 2010)  Even NFP hospitals with 
negative profits held 15% of their assets as cash or securities.  Moreover, analysis of Medicare 
Cost Report data suggests NFP hospitals affiliated with multihospital systems hold smaller stores 
of cash and financial investments than independent NFP hospitals.   Not-for-profit hospitals have 
                                                 
1 Rivenson et al (2000) examine different ways to conceptualize NFP hospitals’ liquid asset holdings and finds that 
hospitals holding large cash balances also tend to hold large stores of other liquid financial assets. 
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sizeable investments in financial assets.  If system membership reduces the optimal level of 
financial assets NFP hospitals should hold, acquired hospitals’ financial investments should be a 
ready source of internal capital to fund real investment opportunities. 
Understanding the financing benefits of system membership and how these benefits are 
achieved is important.  If system membership allows a hospital to shift its asset structure and 
reduce its holdings of cash (an asset that produces a relatively low return) to make investments in 
real assets (that produce a higher return), this would greatly increase the efficiency of the 
hospital’s financial management.  However, the costs of system membership can be large for 
independent hospitals. These costs include a loss of autonomy and community control, 
transactions costs associated with the system acquisition (Herman, 2014; Mitrakos, 2012) and 
possible increases in the prices of hospital services to the community. (Melnick & Keeler, 2007)  
Moreover, there is reason to believe system membership may not affect acquired hospitals’ 
access to capital at all.  Systems are likely motivated to acquire hospitals for reasons other than 
their desire improve the acquired hospital’s access to capital.  Acquiring systems may be 
motivated by the idea that an acquisition is “a good deal” because the cost of acquiring a hospital 
is lower than the revenues the hospital will produce, or by the desire to realize economies of 
scale (though there is little evidence these benefits are realized (Burns & Pauly, 2002; Dranove, 
Durkac, & Shanley, 1996; Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Sloan, Conover, & Ostermann, 2003).  
Many of these objectives can be achieved even without a change in optimal cash holdings that 
frees up cash reserves for investment in real assets.  Moreover, system acquisition is not likely to 
reduce cash holdings for all acquired hospitals.  Despite the relatively large cash holdings most 
independent NPF hospitals maintain, some acquired hospitals join systems precisely because 
they are facing financial distress and have minimal cash holdings.  Hospitals acquired because 
18 
 
they face financial distress may actually experience increases in their cash holdings after 
acquisition by a system. 
This paper adds to our understanding of how system membership affects an acquired 
hospital’s ability to access capital by examining whether system membership frees up financial 
assets that can be used to fund real investment.  In the sections that follow, this paper will review 
financial theory that explains how firms determine their optimal level of cash and financial asset 
holdings.  This framework suggests several reasons NFP hospitals maintain large cash balances 
and several characteristics of multihospital systems that may cause optimal cash balances of NFP 
system hospitals to be smaller than their independent counterparts.  Finally, the hypothesis that 
acquired hospitals with high cash holdings may experience reductions in their cash balances after 
joining systems is examined empirically using a panel of independent NFP hospitals acquired by 
NFP hospital systems. 
 
How firms set optimal cash balances 
If capital markets were perfect, financing would be available for all investment 
opportunities that promised returns great enough to compensate for a project’s risk.  Firms could 
easily raise this financing at rates that appropriately reflected a project’s risk.  Cash balances 
would be small because cash would only be used to meet working capital needs.  However, for 
some firms informational and agency concerns create differences in the cost of internal and 
external financing.  (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & Poterba, 1988)  Not-for-profit firms 
have a limited ability to raise external capital since they are unable to sell shares of equity and 
must rely solely on donated capital and debt issues.  As a result of these market imperfections, 
firms must hold cash balances not only for transactional purposes but as a precaution in case 
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external financing is unavailable or excessively costly (only available at rates significantly above 
a project’s risk-adjusted expected return).  But how much cash should a firm hold?  A 1999 
article by Opler et al provides the theoretical and empirical basis for much of the existing 
research on optimal cash balances.   Opler suggests that firms face costs associated with holding 
cash as well as costs of experiencing a cash shortfall.  Costs of holding cash include profits from 
forgone investments and agency costs resulting from large cash balances that insulate managers 
from the oversight.  Firms also face costs of holding too little cash.  These costs include being 
forced to either pass up investment opportunities or to issue costly debt to take advantage of 
investment opportunities.  If the cash shortfall is sufficiently severe, a firm may be forced to sell 
off assets at a discount to raise the funds necessary to prevent bankruptcy.  A firm’s optimal cash 
balance equates the expected marginal costs of holding too much and too little cash.  Opler et al 
refer to this theory of cash management as the “tradeoff theory” of cash management.  Using a 
sample of investor-owned firms, Opler et al finds that firms maintain target cash balances over 
time and that these firms tend to increase cash balances when actual cash balances fall below 
target balances.  These results are consistent with the idea that firms have an optimal cash 
balance.  The costs that create these optimal balances---costs of holding cash and the cost of a 
cash shortfall---are discussed in more detail below. 
Costs of holding cash 
 The primary cost of holding cash is the difference between the return it generates when 
held as a liquid assets and the return that it would generate if put to its most profitable use.  This 
is known as the liquidity premium, because in most cases the return on cash holdings is below 
the returns associated with other possible uses for cash.  (Merton H. Miller & Orr, 1966; Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999)  To see this, consider how an investor-owned firm 
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operating to maximize shareholder value can use cash.  There are three possible uses of cash.  
First, the firm may hold cash for transactional purposes the form of safe, liquid, low-return 
securities.  If excess cash is available, the firm will invest it in real assets expected to produce a 
return greater than the firm’s cost of capital.  If none of the available projects are expected to 
produce returns at or above the cost of capital, the firm should return cash to shareholders.  
Holding cash is costly because the return on cash holdings is below the return investors expect 
on their equity and, equivalently, below the required returns on real investments.     
In addition to costs created by the liquidity premium, cash balances can also lead to 
agency costs.  Agency costs arise because managers have incentives to pursue their own 
objectives to the detriment of firm owners. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)  These objectives can 
include shirking work duties, increasing executive compensation, consuming perquisites, or 
investing in projects with a low expected return simply to expand the size of the organization 
(“empire building”).  (Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003)(Blanchard, 
1994)(Jensen, 1986)(Harford, 1999)  Large cash holdings can make it easier for managers to 
pursue these objectives.  Investment in low-return projects is simpler because managers are not 
subjected to monitoring by external capital markets.  (Opler et al., 1999)  Inefficient operation, 
perquisite consumption and unwarranted increases in executive compensation are more likely 
because excess cash protects inefficient firms from the financial distress that they might face 
without cash reserves.  The existence of these agency costs reduces a firm’s optimal cash 
balance.  However, unless a firm has good governance mechanisms in place to monitor and 
control managers’ actions equity holders will not realize the extent of the agency costs imposed 
by large cash balances, nor will equity holders take actions to reduce these costs.  As a result the 
firm will tend to accumulate cash reserves in excess of its optimal balance.  (Opler et al., 1999)   
21 
 
Expected costs of cash shortfalls 
If capital markets were perfect there would be no cost to a cash shortfall.  When 
investment opportunities arose firms could borrow from banks or bondholders willing to provide 
financing at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate and without incurring transactions costs of 
issuance.  However, agency costs and asymmetric information problems make internal financing 
cheaper than external financing for some firms (Fazzari et al., 1988) while for other firms these 
problems create credit rationing that makes external financing completely unavailable (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981).  Firms with low cash holdings and prevalent investment opportunities face costs of 
cash shortfalls.  These costs are largest when the firm has no access to debt markets and must 
forgo projects that cannot be funded with cash holdings.  In this case the cost of a cash shortfall 
is the profit forgone when a hospital must pass up a profitable investment opportunity.  A 
similar, though less severe cost of maintaining a small cash balance is realized by firms for 
whom external debt financing is more costly than internal financing.  In this case the cost of a 
cash shortfall is the premium a firm must pay to issue the debt required to fund the firm’s 
investment opportunity.   
When cash shortfalls are sufficiently large, a firm may face bankruptcy and associated 
costs of financial distress.  These include asset sales to raise cash needed to satisfy obligations 
and other costs driven by the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s future including strained 
relationships with suppliers and customers.  These indirect costs of financial distress are large.  
Estimates of these costs range from 11% (Altman, 1984) to 23% (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) of 
the firm’s pre-distress value. 
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Independent NFP hospital cash balances 
Not-for-profit hospitals have optimal cash balances and maintain target cash balances in 
the same way as investor-owned firms.  (Rivenson, Reiter, Wheeler, & Smith, 2011)  However, 
the unique features of independent, NFP hospitals affect the size of these optimal cash balances 
by affecting both the cost of a cash shortfall and the cost of holding cash.  Specifically, 
independent NFP hospitals have financial and operating characteristics that make their expected 
cost of cash shortfalls high relative to investor-owned and system-affiliated NFP hospitals, 
resulting in a higher optimal level of cash holdings for independent NFP hospitals.  Independent 
NFP hospitals may also have lower costs of holding cash, which would lead these hospitals to 
hold more cash.  This would be the case if independent NFP hospitals are better able to engage in 
arbitrage by issuing tax-exempt debt or if poor governance reduces these hospitals’ perceived 
cost of holding a large cash balance.  Either of these factors would make independent NFP 
hospitals’ costs of holding cash relatively low, though whether or not independent and system-
affiliated hospitals actually differ in the quality of their governance or their ability to engage in 
tax arbitrage is less clear.   
High costs of a cash shortfall 
 Financial market imperfections lead to differences in the cost of internal and external 
financing.  As a result a cash shortfall creates costs related to the inability to finance profitable 
investment opportunities or the premium required to raise external financing.  Not-for-profit 
hospitals are especially likely to face costly external financing.  The most important factor 
increasing NFP hospitals’ cost of external financing is these hospitals’ limited access to equity 
capital.  Since NFP hospitals cannot issue new shares of equity, funding investment opportunities 
often requires new debt financing and a shift in capital structure that is difficult to reverse.  This 
shift is costly if a hospital enjoyed an optimal capital structure before taking on additional debt, 
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and even more costly if the hospital was over-levered.  The use of cash can also increase the 
premium on external financing if it results in a downgrade to the hospital’s bond rating.  Many 
hospitals report that they target cash holdings at a level that will allow them to maintain a 
specific bond rating (Rivenson et al., 2000)    
There is evidence that independent, NFP hospitals experience both costs of forgone 
investment and costs of raising “expensive” external financing.  Not-for-profit hospitals rely on 
liquid assets to fund investment and are forced to limit investment when cash flows are not 
sufficient to fund all desired projects.  (Calem & Rizzo, 1995; Reiter, Smith, & Wheeler, 2008)  
() However, system-affiliated NFP hospitals are less likely to rely on internal cash to finance 
investment than independent NFP hospitals (Calem & Rizzo, 1995) which suggests that system 
hospitals may face smaller costs of forgone investment and external financing than independent 
NFP hospitals.  Moreover, the premium system-affiliated hospitals must pay for external 
financing is probably smaller than the premium required of independent NPF hospitals because 
bond rating agencies seem to favor hospital systems over independent hospitals.  (Dunn, 2013; 
Moody's Investor Service, 2012; Standard and Poor's, 8/13/2012; Standard and Poor's, 2013)   As 
a result the costs of raising external financing and the cost of foregone investment are likely to be 
greater for independent NFP hospitals than for system-affiliated NFP hospitals. 
 In the case of a severe cash shortfall, a firm may have to sell off assets to raise cash 
required to meet its obligations and avoid bankruptcy.  Independent hospitals forced to sell off 
assets will like have to endure greater discounts on asset sales than system-affiliated hospitals.  
Hospital systems that need to raise cash can sell off a complete member hospital.  The market for 
hospital acquisitions is active (see Irving Levin Hospital Market M&A Reports for examples).  
On the other hand, independent hospitals cannot sell off entire facilities.  Most of their assets are 
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held in the form of buildings with specialized uses or technology that is both specialized and 
likely to become outdated quickly.  Selling these sorts of assets is likely to require deep pricing 
discounts.  The greater discounts required for asset sales required to avoid bankruptcy are 
another reason the costs of a cash shortfall are high for independent NFP hospitals. 
Not only are the costs of a cash shortfall high for independent NFP hospitals, these 
hospitals are also more likely to experience a shortfall because their cash flows vary more than 
the cash flows of hospital systems.  Miller and Orr (1966) show that a firm’s optimal cash 
balance is decreasing with the size and volume of its cash transactions because these factors 
reduce random variation in a firm’s cash flows.  Hospital systems, by definition, are larger than 
individual hospitals and can take advantage of economies of scale in cash management.  In 
addition to reducing cash flow variation by exploiting economies of scale, systems also have 
more diverse sources of cash flow than individual hospitals.  Systems may contract with a larger 
number of payers spread over a larger geographic area than independent hospitals.  To the extent 
that cash flows from these payers are not perfectly correlated overall variation in cash flow is 
reduced.  Less volatile cash flows reduce the likelihood of a cash shortfall and hence the size of 
precautionary cash balances.  Overall, the likelihood of a cash shortfall is higher for independent 
hospitals than for system affiliated hospitals.  Should such a shortfall occur, it will also be more 
costly for an independent NFP hospital relative to similar system-affiliated hospitals.  This high 
expected cost of a cash shortfall is one incentive for NFP hospitals to maintain large cash 
holdings. 
Low costs of holding cash 
Relative to system-affiliated and investor-owned hospitals, independent NFP hospitals 
have high costs of a cash shortfall and incentives to hold large stores of cash.  Independent NFP 
hospitals may also hold more cash than hospitals with other organizational forms for two 
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reasons.  First, governance among independent NFP hospitals may be worse than governance of 
investor-owned or system-affiliated NFP hospitals.  As a result independent NFP hospital boards 
may underestimate the agency costs of high cash balances and allow managers to accumulate 
excess cash.  Second, NFP hospitals’ ability to engage in indirect arbitrage using tax-exempt debt 
makes the cost of holding cash much lower for NFP hospitals than for investor-owned hospitals.  
Unfortunately, the factors that determine how much arbitrage is available to a hospital are 
complex and it is unclear whether system-affiliated or independent NFP hospitals are better able 
to engage in this arbitrage.  The remainder of this section describes how agency costs and the 
liquidity premium differ for investor-owned and both system-affiliated and independent NFP 
hospitals.   
 Agency costs, including perquisite consumption and inefficient investment, are one of the 
costs firms face when holding cash.  Good governance can reduce these costs and can help to 
limit the amount of excess cash a firm holds.  Unfortunately, many of the mechanisms associated 
with good governance in investor-owned firms are unavailable to NFP hospitals.  These include 
management compensation arrangements that tie executive pay to firm value (usually measured 
by stock price), the presence of large blocks of shareholders to monitor firm actions, or the threat 
that poor-performing managers can be removed through a hostile takeover.  (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997)  Governance of NFP hospitals comes primarily in the form of a governing board 
composed of community representatives acting as volunteers.  These representatives may lack 
the experience to closely monitor managers.  Moreover, board service is voluntary and members 
are not compensated for their service and so many may like the time required to closely monitor 
managers.  As a result, NFP hospital managers may be able to maintain excessive cash balances 
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and enjoy perquisite consumption or “empire building” investment.  Independent NFP hospital 
board members may underestimate these costs.  
 Prior research on the relationship between cash holdings and agency costs suggests that 
large levels of cash holdings can create agency costs not only in investor-owned firms, but in 
NFP organizations and municipal government organizations as well.  (Municipal government 
organizations also lack many of the governance mechanisms used by investor-owned firms) may 
benefit from high cash holdings.  In a sample of municipal governments, Gore (2009) finds high 
cash holdings are associated with larger administrative expenses, higher city manager salaries 
and greater managerial entrenchment.  Among NFP organizations (over 40% of which were 
hospitals) higher cash balances are associated with greater executive compensation and lower 
expenditures on program goals, even after controlling for important covariates like 
organizational size. (Core, Guay, & Verdi, 2006)   
 Not-for-profit hospitals with large cash balances certainly seem likely to incur agency 
costs.  However, it is possible that system membership improves hospital governance, helping 
board members to recognize the high agency costs of holding cash and resulting in reductions in 
cash balances.  System level managers have the experience and resources necessary to monitor 
the managers of affiliated hospitals.  Community board members may lack this experience and 
these resources.  Depending on the system’s organization, system-level managers may also have 
the authority to replace under-performing hospital managers in the same way activist 
shareholders can replace managers in an investor-owned firm.  Even though there are reasons to 
suspect that system membership improves governance of independent NFP hospitals in ways that 
would reduce these hospitals’ cash balances, research that actually compares the effectiveness of 
governance structures in independent and system-affiliated NFP hospitals is scarce.  It is possible 
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that agency problems at the system-level are no less severe than problems at the hospital level.  
The differences in governance for system and independent hospitals, and whether these 
differences do in fact have an effect on hospitals’ cash holdings are opportunities for future 
research. 
 Another reason NFP hospitals have high cash holdings (relative to investor-owned 
hospitals) is that NFP hospitals have the opportunity to engage in an indirect arbitrage by holding 
cash rather than using it to fund investment.  Not-for-profit hospitals are able to engage in this 
arbitrage by issuing tax-exempt debt at below-market rates while investing cash holdings in 
financial assets with returns greater than the interest rate on the tax-exempt debt.  This arbitrage 
opportunity gives both system-affiliated and independent NFP hospitals a low liquidity premium 
and hence a low cost of holding cash.  The availability of indirect arbitrage opportunities is an 
important reason NFP hospital hold larger cash balances than their investor-owned counterparts.  
(Wheeler, Smith, Rivenson, & Reiter, 2000)   
It is clear that indirect arbitrage opportunities are available to NFP hospitals, but it is less 
clear whether system membership increases or decreases these opportunities.  Wedig et al (1996) 
develop a theoretical model describing the conditions necessary for indirect arbitrage to take 
place.  The extent to which this arbitrage is available depends on several factors including: a) the 
availability of projects qualifying for tax-exempt debt; b) the availability of profitable investment 
opportunities that do not qualify for tax-exempt debt; c) the degree of the hospital’s leverage; d) 
the size of the hospital’s cash holdings.  System membership could create new investment 
opportunities that qualify for tax-exempt financing.  This would increase the independent 
hospital’s opportunities for indirect arbitrage, decrease the cost of holding cash and increase the 
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hospital’s cash holdings.2  Alternatively, system membership could create new investment 
opportunities that did not qualify for tax-exempt financing.  In this case, cash reserves would be 
used to fund these projects and the hospital’s cash holdings would fall.  Clearly the determinants 
of a NFP hospital’s liquidity premium are complex and the effects of system membership on this 
premium, and hence a hospital’s cash balances, is an opportunity for future theoretical and 
empirical research. 
 
Does acquisition by a system reduce hospitals’ cash balances? 
 The previous sections have described a number of theoretical reasons that system-
affiliated NFP hospitals should have lower optimal cash balances than independent NFP 
hospitals.  However, the discussion in the previous sections has neglected an important, practical 
point.  Even if independent NFP hospitals have relatively high optimal cash balances, they may 
have trouble actually accumulating these balances.  This is especially true in a sample of 
hospitals acquired by systems because some of these acquired hospitals may be joining systems 
precisely because they were unable to generate adequate cash to support their operations, much 
less fund investment and precautionary reserves.  The remainder of this paper is devoted to 
answering two questions.  First, in the sample of acquired NFP hospitals, how many have excess 
cash holdings that system membership could “free up” to be used in investment.   Second, for the 
sample of acquired NFP hospitals with excess cash holdings, does system membership actually 
result in reductions in these cash holdings as theory suggests. 
 
                                                 
2 This is true for hospitals with relatively low leverage.  Higher leverage decreases the opportunity for arbitrage by 
increasing the interest rate for all debt types, even tax-exempt debt, and reducing the spread between the cost of debt 
and the expected return on financial assets. 
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Data and sample 
Study data come from two sources, the American Hospital Association (AHA) hospital 
database records from 1996-2009 and Medicare Cost Report (MCR) records from 1996-2009.  
The AHA data come from files maintained and updated yearly by the AHA.  Medicare Cost 
Report (MCR) data are collected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and 
contain information on costs and other characteristics for all US hospitals that accept Medicare 
patients.  Data used in this study come from Schedule G of the cost report.  Medicare Cost 
Report data are audited and widely used in academic research (for example, (Dranove & 
Lindrooth, 2003; Kim & McCue, 2008)(Bazzoli, Chan, Shortell, & D'Aunno, 2000)). However, 
these data have also been criticized as inaccurately describing hospitals’ financial conditions and 
the costs hospitals incur in providing care.  (Kane & Magnus, 2001; Magnus & Smith, 2000)  
Unfortunately, most sources of hospital financial data have limitations, and a nationally 
representative dataset containing audited financial information at the hospital level is not 
available ((Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2004)).    
The sample is also restricted to NFP hospitals, since this study focuses on how system 
membership changes NFP hospitals’ ability to use internal cash reserves for capital investment.  
We have excluded from the sample hospitals with unusual organizational characteristics 
including hospitals owned by the state, local and federal governments, hospitals located in US 
territories outside the 50 US states, hospitals not classified by the AHA as providing general 
acute care services and hospitals that did not appear in both the AHA and MCR data.  These 
hospitals have characteristics that may cause their cash management procedures to differ from 
other hospitals.  Hospitals with multiple system status changes and hospitals with system status 
changes that could not be confirmed are excluded also. The derivation of the sample is described 
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further in Table 2.1.  Several hospitals were excluded because they had missing data or data 
values that were unrealistically large or small.  We list the rules used to define unrealistic data in 
Table 2.2.   
 Hospitals are required to file partial-year cost reports in cases where the hospital’s 
ownership changes or the hospital adopts a new beginning date for its fiscal year.  As a result, the 
Medicare Cost Report data occasionally contain multiple reports for the same hospital in the 
same year.  When this was the case for acquired hospitals we kept the earlier observation if the 
duplicate occurred in the pre-acquisition period and the later observation if the duplicate 
occurred in the post-acquisition period.  When independent hospitals without a change in system 
status had duplicate observations we retained the later of the duplicate observations. 
 
Measures 
Cash holdings 
Cash holdings are measured using the “days cash on hand” metric common in practice 
and previous research on hospital cash holdings.  Days cash on hand is computed as a hospital’s 
total cash holdings divided by the hospital’s average daily operating expenses.  This measure is 
comparable for hospitals of different sizes and offers an intuitive interpretation (the number of 
days a hospital could continue operating without taking in any additional cash).  Both the cash 
holdings and operating expense amounts used to compute the ‘days cash on hand’ measure are 
taken from the Medicare Cost Report’s Schedule G.  Cash holdings here include actual cash 
balances as well as notes receivable, temporary investments and other financial investments.  All 
financial investments, rather than just short-term investments, are included in the cash measure 
because long-term investments could potentially be liquidated to fund capital investment. 
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Excess cash 
This study examines whether acquired hospitals have excess cash holdings and whether 
system membership reduces these cash holdings.  However, determining what constitutes 
“excess cash holdings” for a particular hospital is challenging.  This study uses three measures of 
excess cash holdings since there is not a universally agreed upon measure of excess cash.  The 
first two measures define excess cash based on the distribution of cash holdings for independent, 
NFP hospitals.  These measures define hospitals with excess cash holdings as hospitals that have 
cash holdings greater than the 75th or the 50th percentile of all permanent independent hospitals.  
This measure assumes that hospitals with cash holdings above the 75th or 50th percentile are the 
hospitals most likely to reduce their cash balances after joining systems.  Year to year changes in 
financial markets and hospital industry conditions could affect all hospitals’ cash holdings and so 
the 50th and 75th percentile definitions of excess cash are for each year of the sample rather than 
from the pooled data. 
 Using percentile cutoffs to define excess cash holdings is straightforward but imperfect 
because percentile measures do not take into consideration characteristics that affect a hospital’s 
optimal level of cash holdings.  The third measure of excess cash addresses this problem.  For 
this measure, predicted cash holdings are modeled as a function of variables that should affect a 
hospital’s optimal cash holdings.  These variables include proxies for hospital size (total assets) 
since larger hospitals can be expected to hold more cash.  A leverage variable is included as well 
(long-term debt to total assets) since hospitals with better debt market access are expected to 
hold less precautionary cash.  Proxies for profitable investment opportunities (return on assets 
and local market characteristics) are also included since hospitals with a better set of investment 
opportunities can be expected to hold larger cash reserves because the cost of a cash shortfall is 
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greater for these hospitals.  Similar measures have been used as proxies for investment 
opportunities in other research (Reiter et al., 2008) since the typical measure of investment 
opportunities, Tobin’s Q, cannot be computed for firms without publicly traded equity.  Finally, 
proxies for cash flow are included (net patient revenues) since hospitals that typically generate 
more cash can hold smaller cash balances.  Net patient revenues are an admittedly imperfect 
measure of cash flow.  Unfortunately, actual cash flow data are not available for a national 
sample of hospitals and using net income as a proxy is also imperfect since NFP hospitals have 
been shown to manage earnings figures towards zero. (Leone & Van Horn, 2005)  Cash holdings 
are predicted using lagged values of these financial variables.  Ideally, the model predicting cash 
holdings would also include a measure of cash flow volatility.  However, this variable is 
unavailable both because of limited cash flow data and because requiring a lagged measure of 
volatility would have limited an already small sample even further. 
Parameters for the model used to predict cash holdings are estimated using data on 
system hospitals; then, these parameters are used to predict cash holdings for permanent 
independent and acquired hospitals.  These predictions can be interpreted as the amount of cash 
an independent hospital with a given set of characteristics would be expected to hold if it was 
part of a hospital system.  Permanent independent and acquired hospitals with cash holdings 
above the predicted amount are deemed to have excess cash holdings.  Parameters for the model 
of cash holdings are calculated for each year of data rather than from pooled data since these 
parameters may change from year to year as hospital industry characteristics change.  A similar 
method for identifying excess cash holdings was used by Opler et al (1999) and Core (2006). 
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System membership 
 Data on system status is taken from the AHA hospital database.  In keeping with previous 
research in this area, the sysid variable generated from AHA internal files is used rather than the 
mhsmemb variable determined by a hospital’s response to the AHA annual survey (Dranove & 
Lindrooth, 2003).  Two categories of system membership are included in the sample—hospitals 
that are independent throughout the study period and hospitals that are independent then join a 
hospital system.  In addition, data for permanent system hospitals are used to estimate one of the 
measures of excess cash holdings.  The AHA definition of a hospital system includes single 
hospital systems.  A freestanding hospital can be considered a member of a system if the hospital 
is closely affiliated with three or more other healthcare organization (AHA Guide, 2005).  Many 
of the potential benefits of system membership may not be realized for these single hospital 
systems.  Therefore, the system membership variable is adjusted to exclude hospitals in systems 
containing only one or two hospitals.  These hospitals are excluded from the analysis since they 
are not classified as system hospitals but cannot be classified as independent hospitals either.  
This definition is similar to the one used by the bond rating agency Standard and Poor’s 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2013).  Whether the effects of system membership differ for one to two 
hospital systems versus larger systems is an opportunity for future research.    
  This study uses a two-step procedure to identify independent hospitals that joined 
systems.  First, data from the AHA annual survey for the years 1996-2009 are analyzed to 
identify changes in a hospital’s system status.  Cases are identified where a hospital was not 
classified as a member of a hospital system, then, in the next year, the hospital was classified as a 
system member.  However, in researching some of these transactions it became apparent that a 
system membership change did not occur as indicated by the AHA data.  To resolve these 
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discrepancies, two sources were consulted--the annual lists of hospital mergers and acquisitions 
published by Modern Healthcare and the Hospital Acquisition Reports published by Irving Levin 
and Associates. If neither the Modern Healthcare lists nor the Hospital Acquisition reports 
contained a record of an independent hospital’s acquisition, the hospital’s webpage and online 
news coverage were used to find evidence of the transaction.  If none of these attempts yielded 
confirmation that the transaction occurred, the hospital was eliminated from the sample.  
Hospitals with unconfirmed transactions were eliminated from the data for several reasons.  
First, some hospitals with unconfirmed transactions clearly listed a system affiliation on their 
webpages but did not offer information about the date on which they joined a system.  In these 
cases it was impossible to assign a system status to each hospital year since only the current 
system status was known.  In other cases, the hospital websites did not contain information about 
a system affiliation.  However, some hospitals with confirmed system affiliations do not 
prominently display their affiliation on their websites so the lack of information about system-
affiliation is not adequate justification for classifying these hospitals as independent.  The final 
sample contains information on 95 acquired NFP hospitals.   
In addition to dropping hospitals that are members of one or two hospital systems, 
hospitals that the AHA data suggest have undergone multiple changes in system status and 
hospitals that become independent after having been affiliated with a system are also omitted 
from this study.  This is done for two reasons.  First, the system status data on these hospitals 
may not be accurate, especially in the case of hospitals with multiple system status changes.  
Second, the study questions relate to the common claim that multihospital system membership 
can improve an independent hospitals’ access to capital.  There are no similar claims to guide our 
expectations about how internal capital reserves could change for hospitals leaving systems or 
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hospitals with multiple system changes.  This paper’s results can speak to the effect of 
independent hospitals joining systems, though dropping cases of multiple changes in system 
membership will certainly limit the generalizability of these results. 
 
Methods 
 This study addresses two questions---do independent hospitals purchased by 
multihospital systems maintain especially large cash holdings that could be a source of 
investment capital, and does system membership lead to reductions in these excess cash 
balances.  The first question (do acquired hospitals have excess cash balances) is answered 
simply by looking at the percent of acquired hospitals that fall into each of the three definitions 
of an excess cash balance.  This distribution is compared to the percent of permanent 
independent hospitals with an excess cash balance.3 
 The second study question (whether system membership results in reductions in cash 
balances for hospitals with excess cash holdings) is examined using a difference in differences 
study design.  This method compares changes in cash holdings for acquired hospitals to changes 
in cash holdings for a control group of hospitals.  In this case, the control group is made up of 
independent hospitals that do not join multihospital systems and also have excess cash holdings.   
For each acquired hospital, changes in cash holdings are measured as the difference in days cash 
on hand in the year before acquisition and days cash on hand in the first and second years after 
acquisition.  These differences are compared to changes in cash holdings for the control group 
over the same period.  For instance, for a hospital with excess cash holdings that was acquired in 
                                                 
3 This measure is most interesting for the measure of excess cash holdings based on predicted cash holdings since, 
by definition, 25% of independent hospitals with have “excess cash balances” above the 75th percentile of cash 
holdings and 50% of independent hospitals will have “excess cash balances” where excess cash is measured as 
having cash holdings larger than the 50th percentile. 
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the year 2000, changes in cash holdings from 1999 to 2001 and 1999 to 2002 are calculated.  
These changes in cash holdings are compared to the average change in cash holdings from both 
1999 to 2001 and 1999 to 2002, for all independent hospitals with excess cash holdings.  
Regression to the mean is not a concern for this study since acquired hospitals with high levels of 
cash holdings are being compared to independent controls with similarly high cash holdings. 
 
Results 
 Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics for the study sample.  Acquired hospitals held less 
cash on average than permanent independent hospitals.  This is preliminary evidence that the 
desire to “free up” internal cash reserves for capital investment may not be a benefit most 
hospitals are anticipating when they join multihospital systems.  Acquired hospitals’ relatively 
smaller cash holdings do not appear to be explained by better access to debt markets than other 
independent hospitals (long-term debt to total asset ratios are similar) nor by better ability to 
generate positive cash flow (at least to the extent this can be captured by revenue and 
profitability measures---both of which are lower for acquired hospitals than independent 
hospitals).   It is possible, however, that acquired hospitals are holding less cash because they 
have a less profitable set of investment opportunities.  The sample of acquired hospitals does 
have a lower return on assets than the group of permanent independent hospitals.   
 Despite the fact that acquired hospitals have lower cash holdings than permanent 
independent hospitals during the pre-acquisition period,  cash holdings nonetheless fall for 
acquired facilities from the pre- to the post-acquisition period (95 days cash on hand vs. 84 days 
cash on hand).  Moreover, the post-acquisition average cash holdings are similar to the average 
cash holdings for all system hospitals. 
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Hospitals with excess cash holdings 
 Table 2.4 shows the number of hospitals from the acquired and permanent independent 
hospital samples with excess cash holdings.  There is no evidence that a greater proportion of 
acquired hospitals held excess cash than permanent independent hospitals.  By any of the three 
measures of excess cash holdings the percent of acquired hospitals with excess cash is relatively 
similar to the percent of permanent independent hospitals with excess cash. 
Changing cash holdings 
Table 2.5 shows difference in difference estimates of the changes in cash holdings 
associated with hospital system membership.  Results from analyses using each of the three 
measures of excess cash are reported.  The evidence to support the hypothesis that system 
membership allows acquired hospitals to reduce their cash holdings is weak.  Both of the 
percentile-based measures of excess cash suggest that acquired hospitals with excess cash in the 
pre-acquisition year reduced their cash holdings by a greater amount than independent hospitals 
with similarly high cash holdings.  Unfortunately, these differences were not statistically 
significant, with one exception.  The two-year difference in difference estimate derived using the 
definition of excess cash as cash holdings above the 50th percentile for all independent hospitals 
suggests system acquisition resulted in 11.7 day reduction in days cash on hand.  This reduction 
has a p-value of 0.07, but there is no theoretical reason that this particular measure of the change 
in cash holdings should be significant while the others are not. 
The results estimated using the definition of excess cash holdings based on predicted cash 
holdings actually suggest system membership is associated with an increase in cash holdings for 
acquired hospitals.  This result is also statistically insignificant but it is surprising that the 
direction of the effect is the opposite of what was hypothesized.  This may be a result of the 
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small sample size or may be because the model used to predict cash holdings omitted variables 
that determine hospitals’ optimal cash holdings. 
 
Discussion 
 Using any of the three measures of excess cash holdings it does not appear that acquired 
hospitals are more likely to hold excess cash than independent hospitals that were not acquired.  
This suggests that few independent hospital acquisitions are motivated by a desire to “free up” 
internally held cash reserves for capital investment.  This could be because independent hospitals 
place greater value on their independence than the benefits system membership offers.  In fact, 
the desire to maintain independence may be one reason some hospitals keep large stores of cash 
and investments.  From a purchasing system’s perspective, independent hospitals holding large 
cash balances may be difficult to acquire.  For some independent hospitals a large cash balance 
may be the result of past and present financial success.  These hospitals may not have much to 
gain by joining systems and may avoid acquisition all together or they may demand a high 
acquisition price or other costly concessions from potential purchasers.  Even for independent 
hospitals with much to gain from system membership, high cash balances create problems for 
acquiring systems.  High cash balances allow a hospital to continue operating without a system 
partner. Without an immediate threat to the independent hospital’s ability to continue operations, 
high-cash independent hospitals may be unable to convince community members, employees and 
physicians that the benefits of system membership are worth the loss of independence.  This lack 
of consensus would make it much harder for an acquiring system to purchase an independent 
hospitals.   
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For the small number of hospitals with high cash holdings that are acquired, these results 
do not support the hypothesis that system membership leads to large declines in cash holdings 
that could be used to fund real investment.  In fact, the results do not suggest that acquired 
hospitals experience large enough reductions in days cash on hand to bring them in line with the 
mean cash holdings for all system hospitals.  System hospitals held a mean of 87 days cash on 
hand, averaged over all years of the sample.  Study results suggest that acquired hospitals with 
high-cash holdings experienced declines of -15.8 days in the first year after acquisition and -20 
days in the second year.  (These results were estimated using the 75th percentile of independent 
cash holdings as the cutoff for “high cash”.  The other two measures of “high cash” hospitals 
lead to smaller estimated reductions in days cash on hand.)  The minimum level of cash holdings 
required to be classified as “high-cash” varied between 145 days (in 2002) and 185 days (in 
1998).  An acquired hospital with 145 days cash on hand (the lowest required to be classified as 
“high cash” in any year) that experiences a 20 day decline in cash holdings would still be 
maintaining 125 days cash on hand, notably more than the system-average of 84 days cash.  
Moreover, the change required to bring high-cash hospitals in line with system averages would 
have to be much bigger than the estimated changes.  The standard error of the estimated change 
in days cash is 23.4.  If the true effect of system membership is large enough to bring high-cash, 
acquired hospitals into line with system averages then this effect must be greater than the 
estimated effect by 1.5 standard errors.4  The changes in cash holdings associated with the other 
two measures of cash holdings were both smaller in magnitude than the changes estimated using 
the 75th percentile as a cutoff to define “high cash” hospitals. 
                                                 
4 To elaborate, the lowest level of cash holdings a hospital could maintain to be “high cash” is 144 days cash on 
hand.  The estimated reduction in cash holdings associated with system membership is 20, with a standard error of 
23.4.  So 144 – (20 + (23.4 x 1.5)) is 88.9, only slightly above the system average for cash holdings (87 days). 
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Study results suggest that the reductions in cash holdings high-cash hospitals experience 
are unlikely to be large enough to bring these hospitals’ cash holdings in-line with system 
hospital averages.  This begs the question—why is the mean level of cash holdings for system-
affiliated hospitals (87 days cash on hand) lower than the average level of cash holdings for 
independent hospitals (113 days cash on hand)?  If hospital systems are not reducing acquired 
hospitals’ cash holdings then why is the mean cash level among system-affiliated hospitals 
different than among independent hospitals?  One explanation is that systems are more likely to 
acquire hospitals with low cash holdings.  There is some evidence to support this idea in the 
descriptive statistics in Table 2.3.  In the pre-acquisition period cash holdings averaged 95 days 
cash, lower than the 113 days cash the average independent hospital held.  A second explanation 
is that systems are successful in reducing the cash holdings of the hospitals they acquire but the 
reductions take longer than two years to accomplish and so the results presented in this study do 
not capture all of the reduction. 
 
Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations.  First, there are limitations related to the quality 
and availability of data from the MCR.  These data have been criticized as inaccurate (Kane & 
Magnus, 2001; Magnus & Smith, 2000) but are also frequently used in academic research.  
Unfortunately, these data do not include variables measuring some of the important determinants 
of hospital cash holdings, like cash flow information or cash flow volatility.  Omitting these 
variables from the models used to predict hospital cash holdings likely resulted in an imperfect 
prediction of hospital cash holdings and hence an imperfect measure of excess cash holdings.  
For these reasons the study includes two other measures of high cash holdings based on 
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percentile cutoffs.  Unfortunately, these measures do not take into account characteristics of 
hospitals that may cause them to optimally hold a large cash balance. 
The relatively short post-acquisition follow-up period (two years) is another limitation of 
the study.  Rivenson et al (2000) found anecdotal evidence that in the late 1990s some acquired 
hospitals had difficulty centralizing cash management.  This suggests that perhaps hospital 
systems require more than two years to make meaningful changes in the cash balances of 
acquired hospitals.  Using a longer follow-up period could provide more information about how 
acquired hospital cash balances change over time.  However, a longer follow-up period would 
also have reduced the already minimal sample size.   
The assumption imposed by the difference-in-differences study design creates limitations 
on the study as well.  This method assumes that acquired hospitals would have had similar 
changes in cash management as all independent hospitals, had the acquired hospitals remained 
independent.  This may not be true.  As a means of testing this, characteristics affecting cash 
holdings were compared between pre-acquisition hospital periods and independent hospitals.  
These results are provided in Table 3.  There were differences among the two groups but none 
suggested the group of acquired hospitals were holding greater cash reserves than would be 
expected or that the acquired hospitals should be expected to reduce expenses more than the 
group of permanent independent hospitals.  Moreover, the assumption that independent hospitals 
that were not acquired is a useful control group is probably more realistic than the assumptions 
required for a cross-sectional comparison of independent and system-affiliated hospitals. 
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Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature on system membership and hospitals’ access to 
capital by using finance theory to identify a new mechanism through which system membership 
could improve acquired hospitals’ access to capital.  Since hospital systems have lower costs of 
cash shortfalls and hence lower optimal cash balances than independent hospitals, system 
acquisition should enable independent hospitals to use some of their cash reserves for capital 
investment.  However, empirical tests suggest that relatively few acquired hospitals hold excess 
cash balances before acquisition.  This is an interesting difference between investor-owned firms 
and NFP hospitals.  Investor-owned firms holding large cash balances often become targets for 
acquisition but this study suggests hospitals with excess cash are no more likely to be acquired 
than those without.   Study results fail to support the hypothesis that acquired hospitals holding 
excess cash reduce their cash balances.  This may be because system membership has no effect 
on acquired hospitals’ cash balances, or because changes in cash balances take longer to occur 
than the two year follow-up period used in this study.  Future research could incorporate 
additional years of data and a larger sample of acquired hospitals to generate more precise 
estimates of the changes in acquired hospitals’ cash balances.  Another interesting question 
worthy of further research is whether systems prefer to acquire hospitals with low cash holdings 
and if so, why these hospitals are preferred. 
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Table 2.1: Sample selection   
  
Acquired 
hospitals 
Permanent independent 
hospitals 
US General acute 
care hospitals* 
576 1,865 
Couldn't be matched 
to MCR 
519 1,684 
Dropping 
unconfirmed 
acquisitions 
219 1,684 
Keeping only NFP 
owned facilities 
156 981 
After deleting 
missing/unrealistic 
data 
131 956 
*Excludes military and federal hospitals as well as hospitals with 
multiple system status changes and all hospitals that are not NFP 
owned 
Ta 
 
  
44 
 
Table 2.2: Rules defining outliers         
    Acquired hospitals Permanent Independent 
Variable Rule 
Hospitals 
affected  
Hospital 
years 
affected 
Hospitals 
affected  
Hospital 
years 
affected 
Days cash on hand* >75th percentile + (4 x 
IQR)  0 0 29 79 
Return on assets >75th percentile + (4 x 
IQR)  6 6 102 155 
Operating expenses 
per bed 
> 0 
0 0 0 0 
Net patient revenue 
per bed 
>75th percentile + (4 x 
IQR)  1 3 21 59 
Total assets > 0 1 1 1 1 
Long term debt to 
total assets 
>75th percentile + (4 x 
IQR)  0 0 8 13 
---- No missing values for 
above variables** 53 65 897 919 
Note:  All variables except for days cash on hand are lagged  
*Days cash on hand includes cash, temporary investments, notes receivable and financial investments 
**These include some observations missing because lagged values are not available in the first year of 
the data set 
Table 2.2  
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics             
  Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition Independent Hospitals System Hospitals 
  mean  sd  mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Days cash on hand 95 83 84 96 113 105 87 107 
Return on assets (%) 1.67 7.76 2.02 9.56 2.67 7.09 3.94 9.3 
Operating expenses (per 
bed) 
447,932 206,185 665,101 330,004 489,890 315,923 549,032 302,991 
Net patient revenue (per 
bed) 
434,569 192,408 666,561 355,397 479,396 309,778 550,498 307,768 
Total assets (thousand $) 123,000 258,000 136,000 164,000 108,000 172,000 153,000 248,000 
Long term debt to total 
assets 
0.32 0.19 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.2 0.31 0.28 
N   95   95   
                   
956    
                
1,044  
Note: All variables except for days cash on hand are lagged. 
N reported is number of hospitals in each group rather than the number of hospital-year observations.  Some hospitals are not observed in all 
years 
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Table 2.4: NFP hospital observations by sample year and measure of excess cash holdings         
Measure of excess cash 
holdings Year     
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total Percent 
Acquired                         
All acquired hospitals 14 18 8 19 5 4 8 4 3 9 95 --- 
 >75th percentile 4 3 1 5 0 0 2 0 1 1 17 18% 
> 50th percentile 7 10 7 10 5 3 6 2 5 6 61 64% 
Greater than predicted 8 5 0 1 0 0 2 2 1 6 25 26% 
Independent                         
All independent hospitals      596 848  831  824  809  806  790  789  796  789  7,878  --- 
 >75th percentile 149 212 208 206 202 202 197 197 199 197 1,969  25% 
> 50th percentile        298  424  416  412  405  403  395  395  398  395  3,941  50% 
Greater than predicted 169  189  37  79  219  100  261  211  217  666  2,148  27% 
The top panel shows the total number sample hospitals acquired in each year of the study.  This panel also shows, by year, the 
number of acquired hospitals that held excess cash as determined using three different measures of excess cash holdings.  The 
measures of excess cash holdings are 1) Cash holdings in excess of the 75th percentile of all independent hospitals 2) cash holdings 
in excess of the 50th percentile of all independent hospitals and 3) Cash holdings in excess of the cash holdings predicted by a 
multivariate model of hospital cash holdings. 
Note: The 7,878 observations for independent hospitals are hospital-years, not individual hospital observations.  This is because an 
independent hospital can serve as a control observation for multiple acquired hospitals. 
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Table 2.5: Difference in difference estimates of changes in cash holdings     
  Pre-acquisition to 1 year after Pre-acquisition to 2 years after 
Cash holdings > 75th percentile             
  Acquired Independent DiD Acquired  Independent     DiD 
Change in cash holdings -62.0 
(27.8) 
-46.1 
(4.2) 
 -15.8 
(25.9) 
-78.0 
(24.7) 
-58.0 
(4.3) 
-20.0 
(23.4) 
Number of acquired hospitals 17   --- 17   --- 
Cash holdings > 50th percentile             
  Acquired Independent    DiD Acquired  Independent       DiD 
Change in cash holdings 10.0 
(6.1) 
13.8 
(0.3) 
 -3.8.. 
(6.2) 
6.4 
(6.1) 
18.1 
(0.3) 
   -11.7* 
(6.2) 
Number of acquired hospitals 61   --- 61   --- 
Excess cash holdings             
  Acquired Independent    DiD Acquired  Independent          DiD 
Change in cash holdings -17.1 
-(20.7) 
-25.4 
-(2.7) 
8.3 
(21.2) 
-24.0 
(17.4) 
-30.8 
 (3.8) 
6.7 
 (17.9) 
Number of acquired hospitals 25   --- 25   --- 
* p-value <0.1 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The first panel shows results estimated when excess cash holdings 
are defined as cash holdings above the 75th percentile for permanent independent hospitals.  The second 
panel uses a definition of excess cash as cash holdings above the 50th percentile of cash holdings.  The final 
panel are results estimated when excess cash is defined as cash holdings above what is predicted using a 
multivariate model. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Cost of Capital, Leverage and System Membership: 
Does System Membership Help Hospitals Achieve Optimal Leverage? 
 
Introduction 
 Hospitals are currently facing regulatory and market forces that make capital 
expenditures critical.    These include new investments in information technology systems 
needed to improve clinical quality, to take advantage of payer incentives to use this technology 
and increasingly to avoid financial penalties for failing to use this technology.  (American 
Hospital Association, 2013)  Capital investment has also been linked to the quality of clinical 
care hospitals provide (Levitt, 1994) and a hospital’s ability to compete with other hospitals in its 
market (Byrd & McCue, 2003).  However, as capital needs have increased many hospitals have 
found raising capital difficult.  (American Hospital Association, 2013; Carlson & Galloro, 2009)    
In particular, many not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals have found gaining access to capital 
challenging.  Hospitals struggling to raise capital have been advised to consider system 
membership as a means of improving their access to capital funds.  Many hospitals expect that 
joining a system will improve their access to capital, even if this benefit is not the hospital’s 
primary motivation for joining a system.  (Ault, Childs, Wainright, & Young, 2011; Janiga & 
Muller, 2013)  Unfortunately, there is little evidence that system membership does improve 
access to capital and even less theoretical or empirical work explaining how system membership 
could do so.   
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Capital access could improve if system membership provides better access to debt 
markets or if hospital systems act as a source of capital for highly-levered independent hospitals 
that lack access to equity capital.  System membership could enable hospitals to take on more 
debt by providing acquired hospitals with financial expertise required to issue debt, by creating 
new investment opportunities that allow the hospital to issue additional tax-exempt debt, or by 
reducing transactions costs as a proportion of borrowed funds.  It is also possible that systems 
serve as a source of equity financing for independent hospitals, allowing them to reduce debt 
levels or purchase assets without increasing their debt holdings. 
Our limited understanding of the financing benefits of system membership is a problem 
because the costs of system membership can be large for independent hospitals. These costs 
include a loss of autonomy and community control, transactions costs associated with the system 
acquisition (Herman, 2014; Mitrakos, 2012) and possible increases in the prices of hospital 
services to the community. (Melnick & Keeler, 2007)  Moreover, there are reasons to believe 
system membership may not affect hospitals’ access to debt capital.  Systems are motivated to 
acquire hospitals for reasons other than their desire to help the acquired hospitals obtain debt 
financing.  Acquiring systems may be motivated by the idea that an acquisition is “a good deal” 
because the cost of acquiring a hospital is lower than the revenues the hospital will produce, or 
by the desire to realize economies of scale (though there is little evidence these benefits are 
realized (Burns & Pauly, 2002; Dranove, Durkac, & Shanley, 1996; Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; 
Sloan, Conover, & Ostermann, 2003).  Meeting these objectives would not require the acquiring 
system to make any capital expenditures or issue any new debt, aside from any debt issuance 
required to make the initial purchase.  Better understanding whether and how system 
membership affects hospital access to capital will help board members of independent hospitals 
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consider the financing benefits associated with system membership and to weigh these benefits 
against the costs of joining a multihospital system.   
 This paper adds to our understanding of the benefits of multihospital system membership 
for a hospital’s ability to access investment capital.  Debt is a particularly important source of 
capital for NFP hospitals since they have limited sources of equity capital.  Several prior studies 
have found that system-affiliated hospitals have higher debt holdings than independent hospitals.  
(Gentry, 2002; G. Wedig, Hassan, Van Horn, & Morrisey, 1998)   However, some of these 
studies use data that predates important changes in hospital reimbursement practices.  Most are 
based on cross sectional comparisons.  Observed differences in system and independent hospitals 
could be the result of hospital systems selectively acquiring certain kinds of hospitals rather than 
financing benefits inherent to system membership.  If system membership does improve NFP 
hospitals’ ability to access debt, how exactly this occurs is unknown.  We also do not know how 
access to debt changes for hospitals with different degrees of pre-acquisition leverage.  For 
instance, do hospitals with relatively low pre-acquisition leverage enjoy larger increases in 
leverage than hospitals with moderate to high levels of pre-acquisition leverage?  This paper will 
address these gaps in the literature.  It begins by briefly discussing established theories that 
describe the capital structure decisions of for-profit firms, and relating these theories to NFP 
hospitals.  Next, the paper will develop predictions about how system membership affects the 
debt holdings of NFP hospitals with low, moderate and high levels of pre-acquisition leverage.  
Finally, these predictions are tested using a panel of acquired NFP hospitals matched to 
independent control hospitals. 
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Tradeoff theory of for-profit capital structure 
 The seminal 1958 work by Modigliani and Miller shows that under a set of perfect capital 
market assumptions a firm’s cost of capital is not influenced by the firm’s choice of debt or 
equity financing.  (Modigliani & Miller, 1958)  Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions include 
limitless access to debt and equity capital for firms, the ability to borrow and lend without 
transactions costs, the absence of bankruptcy costs and the absence of subsidies to use a certain 
kind of financing.  Modigliani and Miller also assume firms are investor owned and they do not 
attempt to describe how the cost of capital for a NFP firm changes with its financing choices.  
Under these assumptions, adding relatively less expensive debt to a firm’s capital structure will 
cause increases in the financial risk of the firm and hence increases in equity holders’ required 
returns.  The increase in required returns on equity will perfectly offset any reductions that might 
have occurred as a result of the increase in leverage, leaving the firm’s overall cost of capital 
unchanged.  In practice, however, Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions do not hold and the 
existence of corporate taxes, subsidies for debt financing (i.e. the tax deductibility of interest 
expense) and bankruptcy costs imply that a firm can make capital structure choices to minimize 
its cost of capital.  These conclusions are the basis of the “tradeoff theory” of capital structure.  
The tradeoff theory suggests that since interest payments on debt are tax deductible, firms can 
reduce their cost of capital by incorporating more debt into their capital structures.  However, at 
some point increases in leverage increase the firm’s risk of bankruptcy.  This risk induces costs 
of financial distress, including strained relationships with suppliers and consumers and losses 
from being forced to sell assets at below market values.  After some optimal leverage point, the 
present value of these costs of financial distress will outweigh the benefit of the interest tax 
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shields that debt creates.  That optimal leverage point minimizes the firm’s cost of capital and so 
firms should work to maintain this optimal mix of debt and equity. 
  
Tradeoff theory of not-for-profit capital structure 
Not-for-profit hospitals do not pay taxes and cannot enjoy benefits of tax deductible 
interest.  However, NFP hospitals do face their own set of market imperfections including unique 
tax benefits and barriers to raising capital.  These characteristics cause NFP hospitals’ cost of 
capital to vary for different combinations of debt and equity financing in the same way that the 
tradeoff theory describes.  For NFP firms, the benefits of issuing debt come not through tax 
deductibility of interest, but through the ability to issue tax-exempt debt and the non-monetary 
nature of the required return on equity.  Much like in the investor-owned case, the cost of 
additional leverage is an increase in the expected cost of financial distress.  The result is that, like 
investor-owned firms, NFP firms have an optimal leverage ratio at which the cost of capital is 
minimized.  Each of the market imperfections that creates this optimal leverage ratio is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
Tax-exempt debt 
For NFP organizations the benefits of additional leverage come not through the tax 
deductibility of interest but through another subsidy to use debt---the ability to issue tax-exempt 
debt.  This debt is tax-exempt in the sense that the debt-holder is not required to pay income 
taxes on the interest payments received.  As a result the debt holder is willing to accept a lower 
interest rate and the NFP firm is able to borrow at lower rates.  Not-for-profit firms that finance 
their operations primarily with equity have an opportunity to decrease their cost of capital by 
adding more debt into their capital structures.  For NFPs, tax-exempt debt is cheap relative to 
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equity financing because hospitals can engage in arbitrage by borrowing at below-market rates 
and investing the equity they hold in securities with returns above the risk free rate.  This kind of 
arbitrage has been shown to be both theoretically possible (G. J. Wedig, Hassan, & Morrisey, 
1996) and practically important in hospitals’ capital structure decisions (Gentry, 2002; Wheeler, 
Smith, Rivenson, & Reiter, 2000).  However, the amount of tax exempt debt NFP firms can issue 
is limited.  A NFP firm’s tax-exempt debt issues cannot exceed the value of the mission-
supporting capital projects in which the NFP invests.  As a result, the benefits of tax-exempt debt 
are limited by this project financing constraint.5 
Donors’ expected return on equity  
Not-for-profit firms may benefit from increased leverage not only through their ability to 
issue tax exempt debt but also because the required returns on donated equity for these firms may 
not increase with leverage in the same way an investor-owned firm’s required return on equity 
does. The nature of the returns expected by donors differs from the returns expected by suppliers 
of equity to for-profit organizations.  For-profit equity investors expect a return that will 
compensate them for the market-risk of the security they purchase.  This required return can be 
estimated using information about covariance between the returns on the firm’s stock and returns 
on the market as a whole.  For NFP firms, the nature and cost of the returns donors expect from 
their contributions to hospitals are poorly defined and have been the subject of academic debate.  
(Pauly, 1986; Silvers & Kauer, 1986)  While it is safe to assume everyone investing in publicly 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that regulations have been written to limit the extent of tax arbitrage.  
However, enforcing these regulations can be difficult.  The regulations prohibit hospitals from 
directly investing borrowed funds into financial markets for the purpose of arbitrage.  However, 
the regulations do not prevent hospitals from borrowing to fund projects that they might 
otherwise have funded with cash from their endowments, while investing endowment assets into 
financial markets.  (Gentry, 2002)   
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traded equity is pursuing the same monetary return, it is quite possible that the nature of the 
return expected by charitable donors is specific to the individual donor.  Some donors may 
expect their donations to be used in adding capacity to a hospital while others may expect their 
donations to be used in expanding charity care provision.  Still others may donate to fulfill a 
vague sense of obligation to support a healthcare organization within their community, with little 
expectation about how that donation will be used.   
The non-monetary nature of donors’ required returns has two interesting implications for 
a NFP hospital’s cost of capital.  First, hospitals with relatively little debt are likely to find that 
debt is much cheaper than donated equity financing.  This may be true either because the 
fundraising costs required to solicit large amounts of donated capital are substantial or because 
the returns a hospital must promise to philanthropists to induce large donations are particularly 
costly.  (D. G. Smith, Clement, & Wheeler, 1995)  Second, the expected return on equity donated 
to a hospital probably does not increase with leverage in the same way the expected return on 
equity does for an investor-owned firm.  If NFP hospital donors do not increase their required 
rates of return as leverage increases, NFP hospitals with relatively low leverage will have the 
opportunity to lower their overall cost of capital by issuing additional debt.6 
Required return on internally generated equity 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately little research has been done to examine how hospital donor expectations change 
as hospital leverage increases.  This is not surprising given the difficulty in defining what exactly 
donors expect and the related challenge of measuring the extent to which that expectation is met.  
Magnus does find a positive association between leverage and the amount of charity care a 
hospital provides and while the study does not directly address the how the required return on 
equity changes with leverage, this finding is consistent with the idea that the required return 
increases with leverage.  (Magnus, Smith, & Wheeler, 2004)  However, it is not clear whether 
this association occurs because donors demand greater returns as leverage increases or because 
charity care is a use of retained earnings and hospitals that provide more charity care have less 
internally generated equity available to finance investment and have a greater reliance on debt 
financing. 
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 A relatively small portion of most investor-owned firms’ equity comes directly from the 
proceeds of selling equity securities.  In the same way, a relatively small portion of most NFP 
hospitals’ equity comes from charitable donations.  (Pauly, 1986)  For the investor-owned firm 
there is no distinction between the required return on internally generated equity and the required 
return on equity provided by external investors.  In either case the required return on equity is the 
opportunity cost of invested funds to equity holders.  In the case of equity provided by new 
security issues the required return is the return of an alternative investment with a similar risk.  
The same is true in the case of retained earnings since investor-owned firms can distribute these 
earnings to equity holders in the form of dividends, and investors are able to invest this monetary 
return however they like.  For NFP hospitals, however, there is a difference between donated and 
internally-generated equity.  As discussed previously, the required return on donated equity is the 
cost of whatever action is required to induce a donor to give.   However, unlike the investor-
owned case, the opportunity cost of internally generated equity is different than the opportunity 
cost of externally provided equity.  This is because NFP hospitals, unlike investor-owned firms, 
are legally prohibited from paying out the equity they generate internally as dividends.  Rather, 
NFP hospitals have three options for using internally generated equity.  A NFP hospital can 
either spend internally-generated equity on projects expected to produce a financial return, spend 
internally-generated equity on projects expected to produce a social return of value to the 
community7 or retain internally-generated equity to insure the hospital’s ability to remain solvent 
and continue providing services into the future.  As a result, the cost of internally-generated 
capital for the NFP firm will be the value of the most valuable forgone use of those equity funds.  
                                                 
7 One may wonder why NFP hospitals provide services of value to the community rather than particular services 
valued by equity donors.  The reason is that the community as a whole provides NFP hospitals a substantial equity 
contribution in the form of corporate income tax and property tax exemptions.  In fact, this is rarely an important 
distinction because the outputs valued by donors and the community are often the same. 
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In practice, this means that NFP hospital boards are frequently weighing the value of projects 
that produce a social or financial return against the value created by retaining equity funds to 
insure the NFP hospital’s future viability.   
While the value of real investment (for either a social or financial return) is unrelated to 
leverage, the value created by retaining internally generated equity is likely to increase with 
leverage.  At relatively low leverage the likelihood that creditors will force a hospital into 
bankruptcy is low and the value created by retaining funds to insure the hospital’s continued 
operation is also low.  As leverage increases, board members are likely to place a higher value on 
holding additional equity as precautionary savings resulting in a rising cost of internal equity.  
Therefore, unlike the required return on donated equity which is likely to change little with 
leverage, the required return on internally-generated equity can be expected to increase with 
leverage.  Wedig et al provide theoretical and empirical support for the idea that NFP hospital 
managers are risk averse and that this risk aversion causes the cost of capital to increase with 
leverage.  (G. J. Wedig, 1994) 
Expected costs of financial distress 
 As is the case for investor-owned firms, the expected costs of financial distress increase 
with NFP firm leverage.  These include direct costs of bankruptcy litigation as well as indirect 
costs like strained relationships with suppliers, loss of market share and the forced sale of assets 
at a discount.  These indirect costs can be significant.  Research on investor-owned firms 
estimates that the magnitude of these indirect costs of financial distress range from 11% 
(Altman, 1984) to 23% (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) of firm value.  The expected value of these 
costs increases with leverage, since the probability of bankruptcy increases with leverage as well.  
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After the optimal leverage point, additional leverage will lead to increases in the expected cost of 
financial distress that exceed the benefits of additional debt.   
Existence of an optimal level of debt 
All of these capital market imperfections---the limited availability of tax-exempt debt, the 
poorly-defined required return on donated equity, boards’ desire to retain internally-generated 
equity to insure future solvency and the presence of bankruptcy costs---suggest that NFP firms 
have an optimal leverage point at which their cost of capital is minimized.  At relatively low 
leverage adding debt reduces the NFP’s cost of capital by allowing it to enjoy the benefits of tax-
exempt debt and avoiding the high costs of attracting additional donated equity.  At some point 
the NFP hospital achieves a minimum cost of capital.  As leverage increases, however, the costs 
of both debt and equity rise because the probability of bankruptcy and the costs of financial 
distress increase.  Because the opportunity cost of a NFP’s internally generated equity is the 
value of those funds held to maintain solvency rather than the opportunity cost to individual 
equity providers (as is the case for investor-owned firms) the cost of equity increases as well.  
The existence of market imperfections, including bankruptcy costs, create an optimal 
level of debt.  However, bankruptcy costs affect optimal leverage in two ways.  The first is 
through the financial risk, discussed previously.  Financial risk is the increase in the probability 
of bankruptcy that comes as a result of higher leverage.  The second way bankruptcy costs can 
affect optimal leverage is through business risk.  Unlike financial risk, business risk is unrelated 
to the degree of leverage a firm holds.  Business risk is related to the variation in the cash flows a 
firm’s operations generate.  Business risk is dictated by the operations a firm undertakes as well 
as its position within product and factor markets and it is constant regardless of firm leverage.  
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However, firms with greater business risk have a higher probability of bankruptcy, higher 
expected costs of bankruptcy and hence a lower optimal leverage. 
Not-for-profit firms, like for-profit ones, can minimize their costs of capital by choosing 
a specific combination of debt and equity.  The existence of a minimum cost of capital suggests 
that hospitals should strive to maintain target leverage ratios that will allow them to enjoy this 
minimum cost of capital.  There is empirical evidence that hospitals do in fact adopt target 
leverage ratios and manage their debt burdens towards these targets, (G. J. Wedig et al., 1996; 
Wheeler et al., 2000)  though barriers to achieving the optimal cost of capital also exist. 
 
Barriers to optimal NFP hospital leverage 
Market imperfections imply that NFP firms have an optimal level of debt that minimizes 
their cost of capital. If these imperfections apply to all hospitals equally we would expect to see a 
relatively narrow range of NFP hospital leverage.  Not-for-profit hospitals operate within the 
same general industry and most face similar business risks including exposure to national policy 
changes and changes in Medicare reimbursement rates and so the costs and benefits of additional 
leverage are similar for all NFP hospitals.  In reality, however, the distribution of NFP hospital 
leverage is wide.  In 2001 the top quartile of hospitals by leverage financed more than 45% of 
total assets with long-term debt.  In the same year the bottom quartile of hospitals financed less 
than 18% of their assets using long-term debt.  (Solucient, 2003)   
This wide range of debt holdings is best explained not by differences in the optimal 
leverage ratios among NFP hospitals but by the existence of barriers to achieving the optimal 
leverage ratio.  Many hospitals may be resigned to holding less debt than they would like 
because they lack the managerial expertise to access public debt markets, because the amounts 
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they need to borrow are not large enough to justify the fixed transactions costs of issuing public 
debt or because they lack addition investment opportunities needed to afford access to tax 
exempt debt.  Other hospitals may hold more debt than is optimal because they have limited 
access to equity capital and face a choice between passing up profitable investment opportunities 
and maintaining a debt level that minimizes the cost of capital.  The forces that prevent hospitals 
from either decreasing or increasing debt holdings towards the optimal leverage point are 
discussed in more detail below. 
Barriers to increasing leverage 
There are not obvious reasons that independent NFP hospitals should choose to pass up 
the benefits of tax-exempt debt financing and maintain a relatively low degree of leverage.  
Nevertheless, in 1996 only 30.6% of NFP hospitals reported using any tax-exempt debt at all.  
Those hospitals that did hold tax-exempt debt were larger than hospitals without tax exempt debt 
(holding a mean of $93 million in total assets compared to $17 million) and held more total debt 
than hospitals without tax exempt debt (mean of $31 million vs. $0.9 million).  Since tax-exempt 
debt is typically issued through bond markets, these figures suggest that issuing bond debt 
through public markets in general and issuing tax exempt debt in particular involves substantial 
fixed transactions costs that make borrowing relatively small amounts costly.  (Gentry, 2002)  
For small hospitals looking to borrow relatively modest amounts of debt these fixed costs of 
issuing public debt may make the effective interest rate on additional debt prohibitively high.  
The presence of these transaction costs is one notable barrier hospitals may face while trying to 
increase debt holdings8, but these hospitals may face other barriers as well.  The generally 
smaller hospitals that carry little debt may also lack the managerial expertise required to issue 
                                                 
8 Technically, transactions costs and the increases they cause in the price of debt are not barriers to optimal leverage, 
but rather factors that increase the cost of capital. 
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and manage large debt portfolios.  These facilities may prefer to employ managers with broad 
expertise to managers with narrow but well-developed expertise in obtaining financing.  Small, 
under-levered facilities may also lack the investment opportunities required to take advantage of 
tax-exempt debt financing.  When the project financing constraint binds and tax-exempt debt is 
not available, the benefits associated with higher leverage are much smaller. 
Barriers to reducing leverage 
Not-for-profit hospitals with more debt than is optimal may also find it difficult to reduce 
their leverage.  These hospitals’ limited access to equity capital is a major barrier to any attempt 
to reduce debt holdings.  For instance, highly-levered hospitals may be able to reduce their cost 
of capital by incorporating additional equity into their capital structures.  Unfortunately, NFP 
hospitals have limited access to equity capital and so reductions in leverage may not be possible.  
Unlike investor-owned firms, NFPs cannot raise equity capital by selling shares in the firm.  
Instead, NFPs are limited to raising equity through retained earnings and charitable donations.  
For many hospitals, recent declines in reimbursement have reduced the availability of retained 
earnings and donations are a small and unreliable source of equity capital (D. G. Smith, Wheeler, 
Rivenson, & Reiter, 2000; D. G. Smith & Clement, 2013).  As a result, hospitals with profitable 
investment opportunities often face the choice between forgoing these opportunities increasing 
their leverage ratio and accepting the increased cost of capital that comes along with it.    
 
The cost of capital and system membership 
 Market imperfections shape a hospital’s cost of capital curve and create an optimal 
leverage point that minimizes the cost of capital, but other characteristics of NFP firms can 
prevent a hospital from attaining that optimal degree of leverage.  These imperfections are likely 
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to affect independent and system-affiliated NFP hospitals differentially.  In fact, when hospital 
industry publications and consultants suggest independent hospitals join multihospital systems to 
improve their access to capital, the implication is that system membership can reduce an 
acquired hospital’s cost of capital.  (Greene, 2014)  Though industry publications rarely suggest 
why access to capital improves, finance theory offers a few possible explanations.  Capital access 
could improve if system membership minimizes market imperfections so that a hospital faces a 
lower cost of capital at its current leverage or if system membership reduces the barriers a 
hospital faces in moving to its optimal leverage ratios.  For under-levered hospitals, system 
membership can reduce the cost of debt by reducing high proportional transactions costs.  
System membership can also help under-levered hospitals add debt to their capital structures by 
overcoming barriers to debt access like a lack of financial expertise and a binding project 
financing constraint.  For over-levered hospitals, system membership may help shift the cost of 
capital curve down by reducing bankruptcy risk and agency costs.  Alternatively, systems may 
help highly-levered acquired hospitals move towards their optimal leverage point by providing 
equity financing or reducing debt levels.   
Benefits of system membership for under-levered hospitals 
Not-for-profit hospitals may be forced to maintain sub-optimal leverage ratios because 
transaction costs, a lack of financial management expertise or a binding project financing 
constraint prevents them from issuing additional debt.  However, membership in a multihospital 
system can overcome these barriers to increasing leverage.  By pooling the borrowing needs of 
multiple hospitals, hospital systems may borrow amounts large enough to minimize the fixed 
costs of bond issuance.  The scale of multihospital system operations also enables systems to 
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employ managers with a narrow focus on issuing and managing debt.  This financial expertise 
enables hospital systems to maintain higher leverage than independent hospitals could alone.   
 Hospital system membership has also developed ways to avoid being bound by the 
project financing constraint.  Wedig, Hassan and Morrisey (1996) find that freestanding hospitals 
subject to the project financing constraint only take on additional tax-exempt debt after 
additional investment projects become available to relax the constraint.  Surprisingly, system-
affiliated hospitals subject to the constraint continue to issue tax exempt debt but do not make 
large capital investments.  Wedig et al note this as an area of future research but suggest that 
some system-affiliated hospitals are using capital investments in other system hospitals to satisfy 
the project financing constraint.   
Benefits of system membership for over-levered hospitals  
 For highly-levered hospitals, increases in leverage are associated with large increases in 
the cost of capital.  These increases are driven by a high expected cost of bankruptcy.  System 
membership can reduce these costs and flatten the steep cost of capital curve for high-leverage 
hospitals.  In addition to changing the shape of an acquired hospital’s cost of capital curve, 
systems may also serve as a source of equity allowing hospitals to reduce their leverage ratios 
and move closer to optimal leverage. 
As described previously, increases in the expected costs of financial distress cause the 
cost of capital to increase with leverage for hospitals with relatively high debt burdens.  Wedig et 
al (1998) suggest that hospitals operating in systems face smaller fluctuations in their cash flows 
and hence a lower risk of bankruptcy than similarly levered independent hospitals.  This is 
because hospital systems receive cash flows from multiple hospitals and as long as individual 
hospitals’ cash flows are not perfectly correlated, cash flow volatility will be lower for a hospital 
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system than for an independent hospital.  Consequently, the probability of bankruptcy caused by 
an unforeseen shortfall in cash flow is smaller for hospital systems than for an independent 
hospital.  As a result, at a given level of debt, additional debt should be associated with smaller 
increases in risk for system hospitals than for independent hospitals.  There is some indirect 
evidence to suggest that greater diversity of system cash flows than independent cash flows 
affects system hospitals’ leverage decisions.  Wedig et al (G. Wedig et al., 1998) finds a weaker 
relationship between hospital leverage and local market conditions for system hospitals than for 
independent hospitals which suggests cash flows from hospitals within a system may be used to 
make debt payments on behalf of other system hospitals when necessary. 
 In addition to reducing a hospital’s cost of capital at a given leverage ratio, system 
membership can also help acquired hospitals reduce their leverage ratios, moving them down the 
cost of capital curve towards an optimal leverage ratio.  This could occur if the acquiring system 
purchases assets on behalf of the acquired hospital without increasing the acquired hospital’s 
debt burden.  Alternatively, an acquiring system could pay off the debt held by an acquired 
hospital.  This would be especially beneficial if the system is able to issue debt at lower rates 
than the acquired hospital.  It is reasonable to assume hospital systems have greater stores of 
equity than most acquired independent hospitals.  Prior research has found an association 
between consolidated ownership and profitability (Clement, McCue, Luke, Bramble, & et al, 
1997) suggesting that hospital systems may be better able to generate equity financing from 
retained earnings than independent hospitals.  The availability of retained earnings is especially 
important for NFP hospitals since retained earnings are their primary source of equity capital.   
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Hypotheses  
 Theory suggests system membership reduces barriers independent hospitals face in 
realizing their optimal leverage ratio.  System membership can change the shape of a hospital’s 
cost of capital curve by reducing agency costs and the probability of bankruptcy.  These factors 
will affect leverage of acquired hospitals differently depending on whether the acquired hospital 
is under-levered, over-levered or optimally levered in the period before acquisition.  Hospitals 
with relatively low leverage in the pre-acquisition period are the most likely to be under-levered 
and facing barriers to additional debt issuance that system membership can help overcome.  This 
reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Acquired hospitals with relatively low leverage in the pre-acquisition period should 
experience increases in leverage after joining multihospital systems. 
 
 Highly-levered hospitals, on the other hand, are the most likely to be over-levered.  But 
the change in leverage that should occur when these hospitals join a system is less clear than in 
the low-leverage case.  High-leverage hospitals joining systems may gain access to new sources 
of equity that enable them to decrease their leverage ratios.  However, if the cost of capital curve 
flattens enough (because of changes in the expected costs of financial distress), the acquired 
hospital could realize a lower cost of capital at its pre-acquisition leverage point, even without 
reducing its leverage.  If the reduction in the hospital’s cost of capital is sufficiently large, and if 
the hospital has investment opportunities available, a highly-levered hospital may actually 
choose to issue additional debt to fund its investment opportunities.  The direction of the 
predicted change in leverage for high-leverage hospitals depends on the relative magnitude of the 
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increases in access to equity and the reductions in financial distress costs.  Many of the 
independent hospital acquisitions reported by Irving Levin and Associates included stipulations 
that the acquiring system pay off some of the acquired hospital’s debt (Irving Levin Associates, 
2006; Irving Levin Associates, 2010) so in practice system equity seems to have an important 
effect while the importance of changes in financial distress costs is less sure.  These factors lead 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Acquired hospitals with relatively high leverage in the pre-acquisition period should 
experience decreases in leverage after joining multihospital systems. 
 
 It is important to develop hypotheses that are conditional on hospital leverage in the pre-
acquisition period since these hypotheses predict opposing effects for under- and over-levered 
hospitals.  It is also important because moderately-levered hospitals are the most likely to be 
maintaining optimal leverage and hence the least likely to experience changes in leverage 
associated with system membership.   
 
Data  
Study data come from two sources, the American Hospital Association (AHA) hospital 
database records from 1996-2009 and Medicare Cost Report (MCR) records from 1996-2009.  
The AHA data come from files maintained and updated yearly by the AHA.  Medicare Cost 
Report data are collected by CMS and contain information on costs incurred by all US hospitals 
that accept Medicare patients as well as other hospital characteristics.  Data used in this study 
come from Schedule G of the cost report.  Medicare Cost Report data are audited and widely 
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used in academic research (for example, (Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Kim & McCue, 
2008)(Bazzoli, Chan, Shortell, & D'Aunno, 2000)). However, these data have also been 
criticized as inaccurately describing hospitals’ financial conditions and the costs hospitals incur 
in providing care.  (Kane & Magnus, 2001; S. A. Magnus & Smith, 2000)  Unfortunately, most 
sources of hospital financial data have limitations and a nationally representative dataset 
containing audited financial information at the hospital level is not available ((Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission, 2004)).    
The sample is also restricted to NFP hospitals, since this study focuses on how system 
membership changes NFP hospitals’ ability to access debt capital.  We have also excluded a 
number of hospitals with unusual organizational characteristics that may affect the way they 
manage debt.  These excluded hospitals consist of hospitals owned by the state, local and federal 
governments, hospitals located in US territories outside the 50 US states, hospitals not classified 
by the AHA as providing general acute care services and hospitals that did not appear in both the 
AHA and MCR data.  Hospitals with multiple system status changes and hospitals with system 
status changes that could not be confirmed are excluded also. The derivation of the sample is 
described further in Table 3.1.  Several hospitals were excluded because they had missing data or 
data values that were unrealistically large or small.  We list the rules used to define unrealistic 
data in Table 3.2.   
 Hospitals are required to file partial-year cost reports in cases where ownership changes 
or the organization adopts a new beginning date for its fiscal year.  As a result, the Medicare 
Cost Report data occasionally contain multiple reports for the same hospital in the same year.  
When this was the case for acquired hospitals we kept the earlier observation if the duplicate 
occurred in the pre-acquisition period and the later observation if the duplicate occurred in the 
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post-acquisition period.  When independent hospitals without a change in system status had 
duplicate observations we retained the later of the duplicate observations. 
 
Measures 
Leverage  
 This study uses two measures of leverage, both of which are frequently used in financial 
research and in practice.  The first is the ratio of long term debt to total assets.  This ratio 
captures the percentage of all of an organization’s assets that are financed by long-term debt (not 
including short term liabilities.  Long-term debt holdings include mortgages, loans and bond 
notes but exclude the current portion of these liabilities.  The second leverage measure is the 
ratio of long-term debt to net fixed assets.  The two measures are similar but can capture slightly 
different dimensions of leverage because NFP hospitals often hold large stores of cash 
(Rivenson, Wheeler, Smith, & Reiter, 2000; Rivenson, Reiter, Wheeler, & Smith, 2011) which 
can have a large effect on a hospital’s long-term debt to total asset ratio but no effect on a 
hospital’s long-term debt to net fixed asset ratio. Consider a hospital that has substantial equity 
stored as cash holdings and that finances most of its capital purchases using debt.  This hospital 
may have a moderate leverage when leverage is measured using the long-term debt to total asset 
ratio but high leverage when leverage is measured using the long-term debt to net fixed asset 
ratio.  The long-term debt to total asset ratio is a better measure of a hospital’s capacity to take 
on additional debt since it includes cash holdings in the denominator, whereas long-term debt to 
net fixed assets is a better measure of a hospital’s propensity to use debt in making capital 
purchases.  As a result the long-term debt to net fixed asset ratio should be more sensitive to 
leverage changes in low-leverage hospitals that have trouble using debt financing.   
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 Empirical tests of the hypotheses developed earlier also require classifying hospitals as 
“high” or “low” leverage.  Unfortunately there are not natural definitions of “high” and “low” 
leverage.  For this study “high leverage” is defined as leverage above the 75th percentile of 
independent hospital leverage.  Similarly, “low leverage” hospitals are below the 25th percentile 
of independent hospital leverage.  Acquired hospitals’ degree of leverage was determined by 
their debt holdings in the year before acquisition.  Table 3.3 shows average leverage for 
independent hospitals in study years. 
System status 
 Data on system status is taken from the AHA hospital database.  In keeping with previous 
research in this area, the sysid variable generated from AHA internal files is used rather than the 
mhsmemb variable, which is based on a hospital’s response to the AHA annual survey (Dranove 
& Lindrooth, 2003).  Two categories of system membership are included in the sample—
hospitals that are independent throughout the study period and hospitals that are independent 
then join a hospital system.  The AHA definition of a hospital system includes single hospital 
systems.  A freestanding hospital can be considered a member of a system if the hospital is 
closely affiliated with three or more other healthcare organization (AHA Guide, 2005).  Many of 
the potential benefits of system membership may not be realized for these single hospital 
systems.  Therefore, the system membership variable is adjusted to exclude hospitals in systems 
containing only one or two hospitals.  These hospitals are excluded from the analysis since they 
are not classified as system hospitals but cannot be classified as independent hospitals either.  
This definition is similar to the one used by the bond rating agency Standard and Poor’s 
(Standard and Poor’s 2013).  Whether the effects of system membership differ for one to two 
hospital systems versus larger systems is an opportunity for future research.    
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  A two-step procedure was used to identify independent hospitals that joined systems.  
First, data from the AHA annual survey for the years 1996-2009 were analyzed to identify 
changes in a hospital’s system status.  Cases were identified where a hospital was not classified 
as a member of a hospital system, then, in the next year, the hospital was classified as a system 
member.  This yielded a list of 519 transactions in which an independent hospital joined a 
system.  However, in researching some of these transactions it became apparent that a system 
membership change did not occur as indicated by the AHA data.  To resolve these discrepancies, 
two sources were consulted--the annual lists of hospital mergers and acquisitions published by 
Modern Healthcare and the Hospital Acquisition Reports published by Irving Levin and 
Associates. If neither the Modern Healthcare lists nor the Hospital Acquisition reports contained 
a record of an independent hospital’s acquisition, the hospital’s webpage and online news 
coverage were used to find evidence of the transaction.  If none of these attempts yielded 
confirmation that the transaction occurred, the hospital was eliminated from the sample.  
Unconfirmed acquisitions were eliminated from the sample for several reasons.  First, some 
hospitals with unconfirmed transactions clearly listed a system affiliation on their webpages but 
did not offer information about the date on which they joined a system.  In these cases it was 
impossible to assign a system status to each hospital year since only the current system status 
was known.  In other cases, the hospital websites did not contain information about a system 
affiliation.  However, some hospitals with confirmed system affiliation do not prominently 
display their affiliation on their websites so the lack of information about system-affiliation is not 
adequate justification for classifying these hospitals as independent.  The final sample contains 
information on 109 acquired NFP hospitals and 972 NFP hospitals that remained independent 
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throughout the sample period Table 3.4 summarizes the number of confirmed acquisitions that 
took place in each year included in the data.   
In addition to dropping hospitals that are members of one or two hospital systems, two 
other sets of hospitals are dropped from the sample-- hospitals that the AHA data suggest have 
undergone multiple changes in system status and hospitals that become independent after having 
been affiliated with a system.  This is done for two reasons.  First, the system status data on these 
hospitals may not be accurate, especially in the case of hospitals with multiple system status 
changes.  Second, this study’s hypotheses are based on the common claim that joining a system 
affects a hospital’s access to capital.  There are no similar claims to guide our expectations about 
leverage among hospitals leaving systems or hospitals with multiple system changes.  This 
study’s results can speak to the effects of independent hospitals joining systems, though dropping 
cases of multiple changes in system membership will certainly limit the generalizability of these 
results. 
 
Methods 
 This study uses a difference-in-difference estimator to quantify the effects of system 
membership on hospital leverage.  This estimator compares leverage changes in acquired 
hospitals before and after acquisition to changes in leverage for a control group of hospitals 
identified using propensity score matching.  This method makes a strong case for the causal 
effect of system membership.  The hypotheses state that under-levered hospitals should increase 
their leverage after joining systems while over-levered hospitals should decrease their leverage.  
Using a simple pre-post comparison, simple regression to the mean could produce results that 
supported these hypotheses, even if system membership had no effect on hospital leverage.  
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However, the difference in difference estimator compares changes in leverage for acquired 
hospitals to changes in leverage for independent hospitals with similar characteristics.  This 
method will provide a good estimate of the effect of system membership on hospital leverage 
unless changes in leverage for the acquired hospitals would have been systematically different 
than changes in leverage for the matched controls, even if the acquired hospitals had remained 
independent.  These estimates would be biased if hospital systems selectively acquired hospital 
that were likely to experience large changes in leverage even without being acquired, but there is 
no obvious reason to suspect systems selectively acquire hospitals likely to experience large 
changes in leverage. 
 To minimize the chance that study estimates are affected by selection bias, control 
hospitals are identified using propensity score matching.  This method uses a propensity score (in 
this case the probability of a hospital joining a multihospital system) to match acquired hospitals 
to independent control hospitals with similar values of observed covariates.  Propensity score 
matching requires that acquired and control hospitals be matched on variables that affect both a 
hospital’s likelihood of joining a system and a hospital’s leverage. (Caliendo & Copeinig, 2005)   
The propensity score is modeled using measures of a hospital’s leverage, its cash holdings, its 
bed size, its return on assets, whether it is located in a metropolitan area, a small urban area or a 
rural area, and a number of market variables including the percent of a county’s residents without 
insurance, median county income and the number of other hospitals in the county.   Propensity 
score matching balances the distribution of these covariates so that they are similar in the 
acquired hospital group and the control group.   
Table 3.5 shows descriptive statistics for three groups of hospitals -- acquired hospitals, 
the sample of independent matched control hospitals and the entire sample of permanently 
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independent hospitals.  In the pre-acquisition period acquired hospitals have slightly higher 
leverage than permanent independent hospitals and fewer days cash on hand.  They are also more 
likely to come from metropolitan areas and less likely to come from rural areas than permanent 
independent hospitals.  Acquired hospitals in the sample are larger than permanent independent 
hospitals (with a mean bed size of 214 compared to 164 for independent hospitals), and have a 
lower return on assets (0.47% vs. 2.7%).   Despite differences between the acquired hospitals and 
the population of independent hospitals, the matching method selects a group of control hospitals 
that is similar to acquired hospitals.  Table 3.5 shows control hospitals are still slightly smaller 
than acquired hospitals and the mean return on assets among control hospitals is slightly larger 
than among acquired hospitals but these differences are small and the acquired and control 
groups closely resemble each other in all other observable respects. 
 One of the challenges to implementing the difference in difference method was 
identifying a post-acquisition period for control hospitals, since acquired hospitals joined 
systems in different years of the study.  To deal with this, acquired hospitals were matched to 
controls in the pre-acquisition year.  Changes in leverage are observed one and two years after 
acquisition.  For example, a hospital acquired in 2000 would be matched to three other hospitals 
with characteristics similar to its own in 1999 (the year before acquisition).  Next, changes in 
leverage from both 1999 to 2001 and 1999 to 2002 would be used to calculate leverage 
difference in differences one and two years after acquisition.  By measuring leverage changes in 
the two years after acquisition we have allowed enough time for systems to make leverage 
changes in acquired hospitals.  A longer post-acquisition follow-up period would also limit our 
already small sample size. 
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Results 
Results suggest that, on average, acquired hospitals experience increases in leverage after 
joining systems.  However, most of this increase is concentrated among hospitals with relatively 
low pre-acquisition leverage which tend to have large increases in leverage.  Table 3.6 shows 
estimated changes in leverage for both measures of leverage, long-term debt to total assets and 
the long-term debt to net fixed assets.  “Low leverage” hospitals (those that had leverage below 
the 25th percentile of all independent hospitals in the pre-acquisition period) experience 
substantively large and statistically significant increases in leverage compared to matched 
control hospitals.  The long-term debt to total assets ratio increased by almost 15 percentage 
points while the long-term debt to total assets ratio increased by 24 percentage points.  In all 
sample years this is a large enough increase to move a “low leverage” acquired hospital to a level 
of leverage equal to the median system-affiliated hospital.  These increases were caused by 
increases in leverage among acquired hospitals rather than declines in leverage among control 
hospitals.  On average, control hospital leverage was relatively stable.  The increases in leverage 
occurred in the first year after acquisition and were sustained through the second post acquisition 
year.  Moreover, these results do not appear to be driven by a few outlier observations.  Of the 19 
low leverage hospitals, almost 75% (14 hospitals) experienced post acquisition increases in 
leverage (relative to the leverage changes of their control hospitals).  In contrast to the large 
increases in leverage seen for low-leverage acquired hospitals, there is no evidence that highly-
levered hospitals experienced changes in leverage.  Estimates of the changes in leverage for 
these hospitals range from a decrease of 4.5 percentage points to an increase of 1.6 percentage 
points, much smaller the that large changes in leverage seen in the low-leverage subgroup.  Part 
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of the reason for the small magnitude of the average changes is that there were almost as many 
hospitals that decreased their leverage (21 hospitals) as increased it (17 hospitals). 
 
Discussion 
 These results shed new light on one of the often cited benefits of system membership, its 
effect on access to debt capital.  The observed increases in leverage for low-leverage hospitals 
are consistent with the idea that system membership helps low leverage independent hospitals 
overcome barriers to issuing debt while the null results for high leverage hospitals seem to 
suggest system membership does not offer these hospitals access to new sources of equity that 
can be used to reduce leverage.  However, these conclusions come with important caveats.   
 Before concluding that system membership improves access to debt for low-leverage 
hospitals it would be helpful to know more about specific mechanisms that caused these changes 
to occur.  The paper’s hypotheses suggest under-levered hospitals increase their leverage after 
acquisition because system membership gives the acquired hospital access to financial expertise, 
because it reduces transactions costs of issuing debt and because it may relax the project 
financing constraint.  However, there are other possible explanations for the observed changes in 
leverage.  It is possible that the increases in leverage are simply allocations of the total system’s 
leverage and that these allocations have no effect financially or operationally on the acquired 
hospital.  Alternatively, these increases in leverage could occur if systems require acquired 
hospitals to bear the burden of the system debt issued to fund the acquisition. (However, if this 
were the case we would expect to see leverage increases among the sample of highly-levered 
acquired hospitals as well.)  Even if increases in leverage are the result of improved access to 
debt, questions remain about what this debt is used to fund.  Possibilities include capital 
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investment, the purchase of financial securities for arbitrage, community benefit or some other 
pursuit.   Unfortunately, data on hospital finances is sparse and often lacks the detail required to 
answer these questions.  In the future qualitative research may be a useful tool for pursuing 
answers to these important questions. 
 It is also difficult to conclude with certainty, despite the null results for high-leverage 
hospitals, that system membership does not affect debt management for these facilities.  As 
discussed earlier in the paper it is possible that some acquired hospitals may respond to system 
membership by reducing their leverage (because system membership brings with it access to 
additional equity) while other hospitals respond to system membership by increasing leverage 
(because the reductions in bankruptcy risk reduce the hospital’s cost of capital at its existing 
leverage and reduce the marginal cost of additional debt as well).  Thus system membership 
could affect debt access in ways that produced two opposing results.  If system membership 
causes some hospitals to increase leverage and others to decrease it, the net result would match 
this paper’s results.  Unfortunately there is no apparent way to distinguishing between which 
high-leverage hospitals we would expect to increase leverage and which we would expect to 
decrease leverage. Another barrier to concluding system membership has little effect on highly-
levered hospitals, is that the paper’s definition of highly levered (having leverage greater than the 
75th percentile of all independent hospitals) may be too generous.  It is possible that this measure 
classifies some hospitals as highly levered when in reality the hospitals are not yet experiencing 
high costs of financial distress or they lack other characteristics which would serve as incentives 
to reduce leverage. 
 Whether a hospital is optimally-levered, over-levered or under-levered is a difficult 
construct to measure.  Percentile cutoffs are not ideal since they do not consider factors that 
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could affect hospitals’ optimal leverage.  Percentile cutoffs measures may also be affected by 
temporary, transitory changes in leverage that do not reflect true barriers to increasing or 
decreasing a hospital’s debt holdings.  One way to improve the classification of hospitals as low 
or high leverage would be to better understand how each hospital in the sample came to its 
present leverage.  For instance, some highly-levered hospitals may have maintained high 
leverage over many years whereas others may have experienced consistent yearly increases in 
leverage.  Hospitals that have become highly-levered through consistent past increases in 
leverage seem more likely to be suffering from a lack of equity financing while hospitals that 
quickly added leverage then maintained relatively high debt holdings are likely to be highly 
levered because their optimal leverage is higher.  Better understanding the trajectory of a 
facility’s leverage could help develop better measures to understand whether the hospital is 
optimally levered and what imperfections, if any, affect it. 
 
Conclusion 
 Little is known about the financial benefits of system membership even though a good 
understanding of these benefits is important to independent hospital board members as they 
weigh the costs and benefits of consolidation strategies.  Public regulators must also understand 
the financial benefits of system membership as they decide whether to allow or discourage 
hospital consolidation.  This paper uses recent data and a research design with high internal 
validity to examine the effects of system membership on hospitals’ access to debt.  The results 
suggest that debt holdings do increase for hospitals with relatively low leverage in the pre-
acquisition period.  This is consistent with the notion that system membership helps improve 
access to debt capital for hospitals facing challenges to issuing debt.  However, to fully 
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understand the extent of the financing benefits system membership provides, more information is 
needed about the mechanisms that lead to changes in leverage and about the ways this additional 
debt is used by acquired hospitals.   
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Table 3.1: Sample selection   
  
Acquired 
hospitals 
Permanent 
independent 
hospitals 
US General acute 
care hospitals* 
576 1,865 
Couldn't be 
matched to MCR 
519 1,684 
Dropping 
unconfirmed 
acquisitions 
219 1,684 
Keeping only NFP 
owned facilities 
156 982 
After deleting 
missing/unrealistic 
data 
155 972 
After deleting 
multiple 
observations 
155 972 
Excluding acquired 
hospitals without 2 
years of post-
acquisition data 
109 972 
*Excludes military and federal hospitals as well as 
hospitals with multiple system status changes and all 
hospitals that are not NFP owned 
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Table 3.2: Rules defining outliers         
    Acquired hospitals 
Permanent 
Independent 
Variable Rule 
Hospitals 
affected  
Hospital 
years 
affected 
Hospitals 
affected  
Hospital 
years 
affected 
LTD / total assets <75th percentile + (4 
x IQR)  
3 4 26 80 
LTD / net fixed 
assets 
<75th percentile + (4 
x IQR)  
5 7 48 82 
Days cash on hand <75th percentile + (4 
x IQR)  
0 0 20 59 
Return on assets <75th percentile + (4 
x IQR)  and  
>25th percentile - (4 
x IQR) 
8 8 160 244 
--- Acquired hospital 
observed before and 
after acquisition 
1 1 0 0 
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Table 3.3: Independent NFP hospital leverage by year     
  
Long-term debt to total 
assets 
Long-term debt to net fixed 
assets 
Percentile 25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th 
1996 0.136 0.254 0.379 0.316 0.581 0.911 
1997 0.119 0.244 0.371 0.278 0.583 0.882 
1998 0.133 0.252 0.374 0.316 0.600 0.913 
1999 0.122 0.251 0.373 0.292 0.595 0.896 
2000 0.139 0.256 0.379 0.328 0.594 0.899 
2001 0.150 0.259 0.383 0.352 0.595 0.900 
2002 0.153 0.282 0.400 0.351 0.624 0.932 
2003 0.169 0.289 0.412 0.384 0.689 1.000 
2004 0.176 0.293 0.413 0.404 0.683 0.988 
2005 0.167 0.295 0.401 0.389 0.674 0.984 
 
 
Table 3.4: NFP hospital acquisitions by year  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
15 23 17 7 21 3 4 9 4 6 
Note: Figures only include acquisitions that maintained the hospitals NFP 
status 
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Table 3.5: Pre-acquisition hospital characteristics     
  Acquired Control 
All Independent 
Hospitals 
  mean  sd  mean sd mean sd 
LTD to Total assets 0.33 0.19 0.33 0.2 0.29 0.19 
Days cash on hand 94 83 92 91 115 107 
Median county income ($) 
     
42,464  
      
10,399      41,953      10,907  
       
43,444  
        
11,787  
Percent uninsured 
(county) 13.0 3.9 13.0 4.6 13.8 4.9 
Metropolitan area 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.51 0.5 
Small urban area 0.24 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.3 0.46 
Rural area 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.19 0.39 
Hospital size (beds) 214 176 203 162 164 148 
Number of hospitals 
(county) 
5.7 7.4 5.3 10 5.3 12.5 
Return on assets (%) 0.47 6.7 0.74 7.4 2.7 6.5 
N   109   327   
        
11,030  
Note: Statistics describe pre-acqusiition characteristics of acquired hospitals and the 
corresponding hospital-years for matched controls.  Controls based on propensity score matching 
using LTD to total assets as a measure of leverage.  Results obtained for controls matched using 
LTD to net fixed assets are not substantively different. 
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Table 3.6: Difference in difference estimates of changes in leverage     
  Pre-acquisition to 1 year after Pre-acquisition to 2 years after 
All acquired hospitals             
  Acquired Control DiD Acquired Control DiD 
LTD to Total assets 0.045 
(0.020) 
0.0013 
(0.0066) 
0.044** 
(0.021) 
0.039 
(0.022) 
0.0002 
(0.0073) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
LTD to Net fixed assets 0.096 
(0.047) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.086 
(0.053) 
0.097 
(0.056) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
0.104 
(0.057) 
N     109 327 --- 109 327 --- 
Low leverage             
  Acquired Control DiD Acquired Control DiD 
LTD to Total assets 0.153 
(0.055) 
0.0048 
(0.0098) 
0.149** 
(0.054)_ 
0.152 
(0.054) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.146** 
(0.061) 
LTD to Net fixed assets 0.30 
(0.10) 
0.013 
(0.046) 
  0.29** 
(0.11) 
0.30 
(0.11) 
0.016 
(0.053) 
  0.29** 
(0.11) 
N (based on LTDTA) 20 60 --- 20 60 --- 
N (based on LTDNFA) 19 57 --- 19 57 --- 
High leverage             
  Acquired Control DiD Acquired Control DiD 
LTD to Total assets -0.006 
-(0.029) 
-0.011 
-(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
0.010 
(0.400) 
-0.005 
 (0.014) 
0.016 
 (0.043) 
LTD to Net fixed assets -0.012 
  (0.079) 
-0.003 
  (0.041) 
-0.010 
  (0.093) 
-0.056 
 (0.095) 
-0.011 
  (0.037) 
-0.045 
  (0.091) 
N (based on LTDTA) 42 126 --- 42 126 --- 
N (based on LTDNFA) 38 76 --- 38 76 --- 
Note: Low leverage includes acquired hospitals with leverage below the 25th percentile of 
all independent hospitals.  High leverage includes acquired hospitals with leverage above 
the 75th percentile of all acquired hospitals.  Percentiles are based on distribution of 
independent hospital leverage, not acquired hospital leverage.  The number of observations 
in the low and high leverage subgroups varies slightly based on which measure of leverage is 
used to define "low" or "high" leverage.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
Significance is based on t-tests of difference in differences.  Differences for acquired and 
control hospitals do not add up to the total difference in differences because of rounding 
error. 
** Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Capital Investment by Independent and System Affiliated Hospitals 
 
Introduction 
The last 30 years have seen great consolidation within the hospital industry, driven in part 
by the growth or multihospital systems.9  In 1979 only 30.8% of hospitals operated as part of a 
multihospital system but by 2001, 53.6% of hospitals were members of a system ((G. J. Bazzoli, 
2003)).   This shift has great potential to change financial management practice for hospitals 
operating within systems, however, despite the prevalent role hospital systems play in the 
hospital industry we know very little about how hospital financial management changes for 
hospitals that join systems.  In fact, most of the literature on consolidation within the hospital 
industry overlooks the effects of system membership, focusing instead on single market hospital 
mergers or ownership conversions (Cuellar & Gertler, 2003).  Research that does examine the 
implications of system membership for hospital management rarely focuses on financial 
management but instead examines how system membership affects hospital efficiency (Carey, 
2003; Dranove, Durkac, & Shanley, 1996) prices (Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Melnick & 
Keeler, 2007) clinical quality (Madison, 2004) or differences in the structural features of system 
organizations (G. J. Bazzoli et al., 1999; G. J. Bazzoli, Shortell, Dubbs, Chan, & Kralovec, 1999; 
Dubbs, Bazzoli, Shortell, & Kralovec, 2004).  Relatively little has been written about how 
                                                 
9 Hospital consolidation strategies include joining multihospital systems as well as full-asset mergers in which two 
hospitals join together to operate as a single hospital under a single license and under control of a single board.  This 
paper focuses on the effects of membership in a multihospital system, not the effects of a full asset merger. 
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system membership affects the way hospitals make capital expenditures.  This is surprising since 
capital expenditure decisions are a critical part of hospital management and consultants and the 
trade press often claim system membership enables greater capital investment among hospitals. 
Capital expenditures, access to capital and system membership 
Capital expenditures are purchases of goods that will benefit the purchasing firm for 
multiple years in the future.  In the hospital industry, examples of capital expenditures include 
the construction of new facilities, the expansion or renovation of existing facilities, and the 
purchase of new equipment or information technology.  Capital expenditure decisions are critical 
to a hospital’s ability to care for patients (Levitt, 1994) and compete successfully with other 
hospitals in the same market (Byrd & McCue, 2003).  Capital expenditures are often very costly 
and the cash flows they produce are realized over many years after a capital purchase is made.  
As a result firms often rely on external sources of funds (or “capital”) to provide financing for 
their capital investments.  For hospitals, these sources of funds can include banks, bondholders 
who purchase hospital-issued debt, donors offering charitable donations to hospitals or, in the 
case of investor-owned hospitals, equity holders who purchase stock.  A firm’s ability to obtain 
funds from these sources is known as the firm’s “access to capital”. 
Within the hospital industry there is a belief that system membership can help improve 
access to capital and hence a hospital’s ability to make capital expenditures.  This belief is 
demonstrated in several different ways.  First, managers of hospitals that join systems frequently 
mention access to capital or the desire to find funding for capital expenditures as motivations for 
joining a system.  For instance, Ludington Michigan’s Memorial Medical Center recently signed 
a letter of intent to join the multihospital system Spectrum Health.  A press release detailing their 
motivations stated “…benefits include expanded healthcare services, better access to capital, 
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improved access to medical specialists…” ((News - memorial medical center - memorial medical 
center )).  Trade articles about system acquisitions also frequently mention access to capital as a 
motivation (for example (Cali & Quinn, 2013) (Ault, Childs, Wainright, & Young, 2011; Janiga 
& Muller, 2013)  Another indication that the hospital industry believes system membership can 
improve access to capital is that professional advisors advocate system membership as a means 
of finding financing for capital expenditures.  The 2010 report A Guide to Financing Strategies 
for Hospitals, commissioned by the American Hospital Association (AHA) suggests “hospitals 
can and should consider partnering with other organizations…that can bring capital to the table 
to fund specific initiatives or the organization’s ongoing operations” (Kaufman Hall and 
Associates, Inc., 2010).  Similarly, industry experts frequently suggest that system membership 
can improve access to capital for some hospitals.  For instance, after the credit crises of 2009 one 
investment banker predicted “The continuing tight credit markets exacerbate the problem that 
tips many struggling not-for-profits into a sale--lack of access to capital” (Carlson & Galloro, 
2009).  The perception that system membership can improve access to capital was prevalent 
earlier in the decade as well.  In 2002 one lawyer specializing in hospital mergers and 
acquisitions commented on the factors that drove independent hospital acquisitions that year 
saying, “The chains have the capital to upgrade those [capital starved rural hospital] facilities to 
keep patients from going to bigger facilities in bigger cities” (V. Galloro & Tieman, 2002).  
Moreover, the bond markets seem to look favorably on system membership when evaluating 
hospitals’ creditworthiness.  A 2012 report from the credit rating agency Moody’s attributes 
many of the agency’s upgrades of not-for-profit hospital debt to “an increase in merger and 
acquisition activity in the sector and not a fundamental change in its underlying credit 
conditions” (Moody's Investor Service, 2012).  One of the clearest ways we know the hospital 
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industry associates system membership with the ability to fund capital investments is that 
hospitals joining systems will occasionally negotiate capital commitments from acquiring 
systems as a part of the sale agreement.  This study has identified 203 deals through which 
formerly independent hospitals joined hospital systems.  At least 25 of these deals were reported 
to include some form of capital commitment.10(Moody's Investor Service, 2012) 
System membership may not guarantee access to capital 
 It may seem as if joining a system must surely improve a hospital’s ability to make 
capital investments, since this assumption is frequently mentioned in the hospital trade press, by 
hospital managers, and by experts in hospital finance, and since some firms negotiate 
commitments as a part of sales agreements.  However, there are also reasons to believe system 
membership may not improve hospitals’ ability to access capital.  First, even when an acquisition 
deal does include a capital commitment, the acquiring organization does not always provide the 
agreed upon capital.  This can occur even in cases where there is a well-funded organization with 
responsibility for monitoring compliance with the commitment.  For instance, in 2009 the 
Hospital Corporation of America was sued for not fulfilling a $450 million capital commitment it 
made in conjunction with the purchase of 12 hospitals in Kansas City Missouri in 2003(Creswell, 
2013).  Similarly, in 2011 Vanguard Health Systems purchased the Detroit Medical Center 
(DMC) hospitals in a deal that included an $850 million capital commitment.  Vanguard has 
several years to fulfill this commitment but its capital expenditures currently lag behind the 
schedule included in the purchase agreement.  The foundation responsible for enforcing 
compliance with the agreement has expressed concern that Vanguard may divert some capital 
towards the construction of new outpatient clinics rather than improvements to existing hospitals 
                                                 
10 Complete information on each deal was not available.  The methods section of this paper describes in more detail 
how deals were identified and how information about each deal was gathered. 
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(DMC hospitals continue to receive capital infusion, but questions linger ).  Finally, discussions 
with several hospital financial managers in Southeastern Michigan have revealed that capital 
commitments from acquiring hospital systems are not always considered reliable.  If hospitals 
that have explicitly negotiated capital commitments as a part of their sales agreement do not 
always see increased capital expenditures, it raises questions about whether hospitals that did not 
negotiate such commitments will receive capital from hospital systems they join. 
 There are also theoretical reasons to believe system membership may not allow 
independent hospitals to increase capital expenditures.  If capital markets are efficient they 
should supply capital to projects that are expected to produce a return adequate to compensate 
for the project’s risk.  The fact that many hospital industry observers have claimed system 
membership improves access to capital necessarily implies the existence of some market friction 
that systems can overcome but independent hospitals cannot.  These frictions could certainly 
exist.  (Examples include not-for-profit hospitals’ difficulty adjusting their capital structures or 
asymmetrical information problems that make any external financing costly).  However, sources 
claiming that system membership improves access to capital rarely provide an explanation as to 
how this occurs, and that is cause to question their claim.  Moreover, there is little peer-reviewed 
research examining the relationship between system membership and capital expenditures. 
 It is important to acknowledge that there are a number of possible explanations for 
independent hospitals to join systems aside from a desire to gain funding for capital 
expenditures.  These include the desire to create market power, the desire to improve efficiency 
(though prior research is critical of systems’ ability to do so (Burns & Pauly, 2002; Dranove et 
al., 1996; Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003), a desire to capture referral streams for the system’s large, 
tertiary care facilities, or to improve the breadth and quality of services offered.  System 
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membership could also be motivated by empire building tendencies on the part of system 
executives who may care more about increasing the size of the systems they manage than the 
capital expenditures of their systems’ hospitals.  If one of these alternative factors motivates a 
hospital to join a system, it is possible that the hospital may not see any increase in capital 
expenditures as a result of having joined a system.  On the other hand, many of these non-capital 
motivations, like expanding clinical programs, may be associated with additional capital 
spending.  Moreover, if system membership improves hospitals’ access to capital, even hospitals 
that are motivated to join systems for reasons besides access to capital should enjoy a lower cost 
of capital making more of the available investment opportunities profitable. 
Understanding the effects of system membership on capital expenditure is important 
Hospital managers should have a complete understanding of the capital expenditure 
effects of system membership because traditional sources of capital are becoming scarcer and 
more hospitals are considering organizational changes as a way to gain access to investment 
capital.  Theory and prior research suggest a number of reasons that hospitals may be struggling 
to access capital and hence to make necessary capital expenditures.  First, not-for-profit status 
can be a barrier to capital access for many hospitals.  In 2011 58% of community hospitals in the 
United States were organized as not-for-profit (NFP) firms (American Hospital Association, ).   
As a result these hospitals are unable to obtain capital by issuing equity and must rely on debt, 
retained earnings or charitable donations as sources of capital.  Issuing debt obligates a hospital 
to make fixed payments to bondholders to avoid default and bankruptcy, which reduces a 
hospitals’ flexibility.  Moreover, holding too much debt can limit a hospital’s ability to issue 
additional debt in the future by reducing the hospital’s bond rating and increasing the interest 
rate lenders require.  There is some evidence that debt has become a less-attractive financing 
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option for hospitals over time as for-profit hospitals have increased their use of equity financing 
while reducing their reliance on debt financing (Wheeler, Smith, Rivenson, & Reiter, 2000)   
Retained earnings resulting from returns on financial investments are another important 
source of capital that has recently become less reliable.  Not-for-profit hospitals often hold large 
stocks of cash and investment securities, both as a way to store retained earnings and as a way to 
obtain favorable bond ratings (Gentry, 2002);(Rivenson, Wheeler, Smith, & Reiter, 2000).  On 
average, 21% of a NFP hospital’s assets are held as cash or investments and as a result equity 
market returns are highly correlated with hospital capital expenditures (K. L. Reiter & Song, 
2011).  Recent volatility and poor performance in the equity markets could limit access to capital 
for many hospitals.  Moreover, there is evidence that NFP hospitals are particularly vulnerable to 
weak credit market conditions and that the credit crisis of the late 2000s may have severely 
restricted hospitals’ access to capital (K. L. Reiter, Smith, & Wheeler, 2008).  While charitable 
donations are a source of capital for NFP hospitals, they are unreliable and are relatively small 
(Smith, Wheeler, Rivenson, & Reiter, 2000).   
Not surprisingly, the hospital industry press has reported that some hospitals are 
struggling to fund capital investments.11  These reports claim hospitals are holding cash, 
concentrating on improving balance sheets, and have been shut out of capital markets (Evans, 
2009) and that small hospitals find capital more costly now than they did before the credit crisis 
of 2008 (Evans, 2010).  There are even reports that, in their search for capital, NFP hospitals are 
more willing to discuss and entertain the idea of a sale or other transaction than they were in the 
past (V. Galloro, 2010).  Given recent challenging credit conditions, the importance of capital 
                                                 
11 Reports from the industry press are one of the only sources of information on capital expenditures among 
hospitals since there is little research relating to this topic.  In the past the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
conducted a survey of capital expenditures by hospitals, but a recent version of this survey is not available. 
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expenditures to hospitals and the increasing number of hospitals being directed to consider 
joining a system to improve capital access, a study on the relationship between capital spending 
and system membership is warranted.   
 
Previous literature 
 Capital investment among hospitals is a thinly studied topic.  There are, however, several 
papers that look at system membership and its effect on access to capital directly by measuring 
either the cost of debt (Sloan et al., 1987) or investment cash flow sensitivity (Calem and Rizzo, 
1995).  Two other papers examine the determinants of capital investment but also include 
controls for system membership.  Most of this research concludes that system membership has 
little effect on a hospital’s ability to make capital expenditures.  Unfortunately, some of these 
papers predate important changes in hospital markets.  Others are limited in their ability to draw 
conclusions about the effect of system membership on capital investment because they use cross 
sectional data that contain little variation in system affiliation.      
 Calem and Rizzo (1995) draw conclusions about hospitals’ ability to access capital by 
looking at whether the amount of capital investment a hospital makes is correlated to changes in 
the hospital’s stock of cash and short term investments.  Their study contributes to a body of 
finance literature that suggests capital markets are imperfect and as a result, there are some firms 
for which internally-generated funds are less costly than external funds obtained through debt or 
equity issuance.  Calem and Rizzo theorize that membership in a hospital system may improve 
access to capital markets and therefore capital investment among system-affiliated hospitals 
should not be related to those hospitals’ cash flows.  On the other hand, if independent hospitals 
have reduced access to capital markets, they will choose to finance more of their capital 
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investments using internally generate funds and so there should be a stronger relationship 
between cash flow and investment for these hospitals.  Calem and Rizzo find that among 
members of large hospital systems, investment and cash flow are not significantly related while a 
statistically significant relationship between investment and cash flow does exist for members of 
small systems and for hospitals unaffiliated with any system.  Unlike results in the other studies, 
these conclusions are consistent with the common wisdom that system membership can improve 
access to capital and increase capital expenditures.  However, they are lacking in a few respects.  
First, their cash and cash flow data appear to be reported for individual facilities.  It is possible, 
and indeed likely, that hospital systems manage cash centrally and that for system hospitals, the 
authors’ measures of cash may not reflect the true liquidity available to the managers of 
individual facilities.  If funds are managed centrally to insure higher returns on liquid 
investments, rather than to give system managers discretion in distributing cash to facilities, this 
centralized management would reduce investment cash flow sensitivity for system hospitals 
without affecting those facilities’ access to capital. It is also possible that systems selectively 
acquire hospitals likely to have good access to capital.  The authors’ sample did not include any 
hospitals that joined or left systems and would have difficulty identifying this sort of selection 
issue. 
 It is important to note that this study looks at investment cash flow sensitivity rather than 
capital investment.  As a result, Calem and Rizzo could be picking up a managerial rather than a 
financial difference in system and independent hospitals.  If system membership limits the ability 
of facility-level managers to initiate capital projects, perhaps the reduced sensitivity of cash flow 
to investments has more to do with fiscal discipline imposed by system membership than with 
improving access to capital.  
99 
 
As part of a larger study of the cost of capital to hospitals, Sloan, Valvona and Hassan 
examine the cost of debt for both independent and system-affiliated NFP hospitals (1987).  Using 
data from 1972-1983, they are unable to find large differences between the cost of debt for the 
two types of hospital.  However, as the authors point out, during their study period many 
hospitals received reimbursement for interest expenses from commercial and government payers.  
This decreased hospitals’ incentive to take steps to reduce their costs of borrowing.  Moreover, 
this period ends before the introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment system, which 
increased the risk of default among hospitals.  These changes had dramatic effects on hospital 
management, strategy and investment.  If system affiliated hospitals have better access to capital 
markets than independent hospitals do today, the factors which caused this differential access 
could have arisen after the 1972-1983 study period. 
In addition, two studies of the determinants of capital investment among hospitals use 
system membership as a control variable.  The first, by Kim and McCue (2008) uses Medicare 
Cost Report and American Hospital Association (AHA) data to examine the importance of 
market, operational and financial factors in determining the amount of capital investment 
hospitals make.  They determine system membership has an insignificant but positive effect on 
rural hospitals while it has an insignificant though negative effect on capital investment by urban 
hospitals.  The authors used system membership only as a control variable, and they use a fixed-
effects “within” estimator that transforms variables to deviations from their time-series means.  
As a result, the authors are only able to identify the effects of system membership using hospitals 
that converted from independent to system-affiliated.  The number of hospitals changing their 
affiliation status is unlikely to be large given their four year timeframe.  Moreover, they exclude 
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hospitals that have undergone ownership conversions during the study period which is likely to 
further limit the number of hospitals changing their system affiliation status. 
 Reiter (2004) also examines the determinants of capital investment by hospitals, though 
she takes a slightly different approach.  Using data from the Investor Tools database, she divides 
hospitals into high and low investors (those in either the top 30% or bottom 30% of capital 
investment).  She uses cross-sectional data from 1999 that includes hospitals that have previously 
issued municipal debt.   Reiter finds that there is not a significant difference in system 
membership between high and low investment hospitals when making univariate comparisons.  
Similarly, results from multivariate logistic regression suggest system membership is a positive 
but insignificant predictor of being a high-investment hospital.  If hospitals join systems only 
when they are unable to access capital and the proportion of capital-constrained independent 
hospitals is relatively small, a cross sectional study would be unlikely to identify these 
differences. 
 In contrast to claims made by industry observers, results from previous research on the 
relationship between system membership and capital expenditure have been mixed.  This could 
be because previous studies have relied only on cross section data or relatively short panels of 
data.  It could also be because some studies were recent while others used data from periods 
before prospective payment for capital was implemented.  Our understanding of the relationship 
between system membership and capital investment could be improved greatly by a study that 
uses recent data on hospitals changing from independent to system-affiliated status.   
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Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
The primary question this paper seeks to answer is whether or not an independent 
hospital’s decision to join a system results in an increase in that hospital’s capital expenditures.  
To test this hypothesis I use a difference in differences model.  This model compares the changes 
in capital expenditure for independent hospitals that join systems (the first difference) to the 
changes in capital expenditure among hospitals without a system-status change (the second 
difference).  I include hospitals without a system-status change (both independent and system-
affiliated hospitals) to control for trends in capital expenditures that would have affected 
changing hospitals, even if they had remained independent.  For instance, if capital expenditures 
among all hospitals increased because reimbursement became more generous over the time 
period studied, simply looking at changes in capital expenditure among acquired hospitals would 
not allow me to distinguish the effect of joining a system from the broader industry trend.  This 
framework relies on the assumption that if acquired hospitals had not joined systems, their 
capital expenditure trends would have been similar to capital expenditure trends among hospitals 
without a system status change. 
Formally, I test the following model: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠5𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠6𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡                               (1) 
Where capex is capital expenditure for hospital i in year t.  Since acquired hospitals may 
experience a surge in capital expenditures shortly after acquisition, followed by a period of 
relatively low expenditure after initial capital needs are met, I allow the effect of system 
membership in the initial years after acquisition to be different from the effect in later years.  The 
variables PostSys5 and PostSys6Plus describe these two effects.  PostSys5 is a binary variable 
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equal to one for hospital-year observations in the first five years after an independent hospital 
joins a system, while PostSys6 includes time periods later than five years after a hospital changes 
its system status.  The variables PostSys5 and PostSys6 estimate the average change in capital 
expenditures associated with independent hospitals joining systems, net of capital expenditure 
changes occurring in hospitals without a change in system status. 
If system membership does promote high levels of capital expenditure, I would expect 
system-affiliated hospitals to have consistently higher capital expenditures than independent 
hospitals.  To account for this difference I include the variables SysPerm and IndPerm which 
describe whether a hospital was system-affiliated or independent throughout the study’s time 
period.  I also add time-varying controls for organizational and market characteristics of each 
hospital since systems may selectively acquire hospitals with organizational characteristics that 
make capital expenditure growth likely.  I include state fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
state factors affecting capital expenditures.  One such factor is variation in the existence or 
stringency of state-level certificate of need laws.  These laws are unlikely to change much over 
the study period, but could be an important determinant of hospital capital expenditures.  Failing 
to account for these kinds of state-specific differences could bias my estimates if, early in my 
study period, acquisitions were more common in high-spending states than in low-spending 
states, and as a result a large proportion of my post-change observations come from hospitals in 
high-spending states.   
I include year fixed effects as well.  These are especially important since, as Figure 1 
shows, average capital expenditures among all hospitals rose throughout the study period.  Most 
of my post-acquisition observations come in later years when capital expenditure for all hospitals 
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was higher.  Adding year fixed-effects allows me to control for the total amount of capital 
spending among all hospitals in each year. 
I also test a second version of this model that allows the effects of system membership to 
vary over each two year period after acquisition.  The timing of changes in capital expenditures 
can suggest what aspects of system membership enabled them.  For instance, large changes in 
capital expenditures early in the post-acquisition period suggest that the system may be funding 
investment directly.  Modest increases in capital expenditure occurring later in the post-
acquisition period could suggest that funding for these kinds of capital expenditures came from 
improvements in the hospital’s profitability or operations.  Formally I test the model: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠01𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠23𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠45𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠6𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡       (2) 
PostSys01 is a binary variable equal to one for changing hospital observations in the year of 
acquisition or the first year after acquisition.  PostSys23 and PostSys45 are observations in the 
second or third and fourth and fifth years after acquisition.  As before, PostSys6Plus describes 
capital expenditure changes greater than six years after acquisition.   
Effect of system membership on hospitals with the oldest facilities 
One concern I have is that the effects of joining a multihospital system may vary greatly 
for different kinds of acquired hospitals.  Hospitals join systems for a variety of reasons 
including the desire to improve access to capital, to improve contracting leverage and to gain 
management or clinical expertise.  Most of these motivations are likely to result in some increase 
in capital expenditures, though some motivations will result in greater changes in capital 
expenditures than others.   
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To investigate this I identify a group of hospitals likely to experience the largest increase 
in capital expenditures: hospitals with relatively old facilities.  I suspect the acquired hospitals 
that have the oldest facilities in the period before they join a system are the most likely to be 
struggling to access capital independently and are the most likely to join systems as a way to 
increase capital expenditures.  If system membership allows hospitals to make larger capital 
investments I would expect to see this effect most clearly in the hospitals with the oldest 
facilities. I test this hypothesis using the following model: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠5𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡5x𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠6𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑦𝑠6𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠x𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡          (3)       
 
OldFacility is a binary variable equal to one for acquired hospitals with the oldest facilities in the 
pre-acquisition period.  The interaction terms Post5xOldFacility and Post6PlusxOldFacility are 
added to allow the post-acquisition change in capital expenditures to vary for hospitals with 
relatively old facilities and those with newer facilities.  If hospitals with the oldest facilities 
experience the greatest gains in capital expenditures I expect the coefficient on 
Post5xOldFacility to be positive and statistically significant. 
 I estimate the parameters in each model using ordinary least squares.  Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are calculated accounting for hospital-level clustering. 
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Data  
Sample 
Study data come from two sources, the American Hospital Association (AHA) hospital database 
records from 1996-2009 and Medicare Cost Report (MCR) records from 1996-2009.  The AHA 
data come from files maintained and updated yearly by the AHA.  Medicare Cost Report data are 
collected by CMS and contain information on costs incurred by all US hospitals that accept 
Medicare patients.  I have excluded hospitals that are federally owned from the study, as well as 
a few hospitals that are located in US territories outside the 50 US states.  Hospitals owned by 
state or local governments have capital budgeting processes that are very different from non-
governmental hospitals, but these were retained in the sample since it is possible that they could 
join multihospital systems in search of capital in the same way that NFP hospitals are said to do.  
I also drop hospitals not classified by the AHA as providing general acute care services and 
observations for hospitals that did not appear in both the AHA and MCR data.  I exclude 
hospitals with multiple system status changes because it is possible that these classifications are 
incorrect and because my theory does not offer predictions about capital expenditures among 
hospitals that join and then leave and re-join systems.  I also exclude hospitals with a change in 
system status if I was unable to verify that this change occurred.  The derivation of my sample is 
described further in Table 4.1.  There were several hospitals excluded because they had missing 
data or data values that were unrealistically large or small.  I list the rules used to define 
unrealistic data in Table 4.2. 
 Hospitals are required to file partial-year cost reports in cases where ownership changes 
or the organization adopts a new beginning date for its fiscal year.  As a result, the data contain 
some cost reporting periods of less than 365 days.  When possible I have combined cost 
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reporting periods of less than 365 days.  In some cases, however, this was not possible.12  I chose 
to annualize the data in these short reporting periods.  Some researchers choose to exclude partial 
year reports from their analyses.  I chose to include annualized the values of flow (as opposed to 
stock) variables from partial year reports because excluding these reports could potential exclude 
capital expenditures made soon after a hospital is acquired.  Annualizing data from partial year 
reports is a common practice.  American Hospital Directory, a prominent vendor of MCR data, 
also annualizes partial year data. I estimated models both including and excluding partial years 
and I found that my treatment of partial years made little difference in my results. 
 
Measures 
Capital investment  
 Capital investment is measured as capital purchases per hospital bed.  In past research the 
capital investment measure is scaled by beginning of period fixed assets.  However, several 
acquired hospitals experienced large drops in net fixed assets in the period immediately after 
being acquired.  It appears that some acquired hospitals wrote down the value of their assets after 
being acquired.  Using a measure that scales capital expenditures by fixed assets would 
artificially inflate capital expenditures for these hospitals.  Scaling capital expenditures by bed 
size provides a more conservative estimate of capital expenditure changes.  In addition, hospitals 
with capital expenditures of more than $3 million per bed are excluded from the sample.  I was 
able to verify the accuracy of the capital expenditure measure for a few hospitals that reported 
spending of $2 million per bed through hospital websites or publicly available information on 
                                                 
12 For instance, if hospital A begins its fiscal year 1/1/2000, and is acquired 12/31/2000 by an organization with a 
fiscal year starting 7/1/2001 the acquired hospital would have a 180 day reporting period occurring between two 365 
day periods.  
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hospital expenditures.  For instance, the data indicate that Providence Hood-River Memorial 
Hospital, a 25-bed critical access hospital, spent $2.4 million per bed in capital expenditures in 
2009.  This seems possible since a local construction company website reports having 
constructed a new wing of the hospital that doubled the hospital’s size, renovating the existing 
wing of the hospital, and installing a new physical plant.13  However, capital spending amounts 
in excess of $3 million per bed were more difficult to verify.  As a result I dropped observations 
where capital expenditure pre bed exceeded $3 million.  Imposing this rule on the data only 
affected 15 hospitals.  Table 4.2 lists all the rules imposed on the data and the number of 
observations affected by each. 
Data come from the Medicare Cost Report, specifically worksheet A7, parts I and II.  
Previous literature has criticized use of cost report data to estimate capital expenditures ((Kane & 
Magnus, 2001)) and cost data ((Magnus & Smith, 2000)).  Unfortunately, most sources of 
hospital financial data have limitations and a nationally representative dataset containing audited 
financial information at the hospital level is not available ((Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, 2004)).  Moreover, data from the Medicare Cost Reports have been widely used in 
academic and industry publications (for example (Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Kim & McCue, 
2008; Schuhmann, 2009)) and are used by CMS to set hospital payment rates.    
 Unfortunately, CMS did not require the majority of hospitals (those that were subject to 
100% prospective capital payment) to report several parts of worksheet A7 for fiscal years 
beginning on or after October 1, 2001 and ending on or before April 30, 2005.  Many hospitals 
failed to report any capital purchase information for this period, creating a large amount of 
                                                 
13 http://www.andersen-const.com/project-gallery?task=view&cid=29&id=194 
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missing data on capital expenditures.  Table 4.3 confirms that most of the missing values of 
capital expenditures are in the years 2002-2004. 
I would be concerned if these data were missing in a systematic way.  However, I believe 
these observations are missing randomly.  The instructions for completing worksheet A7, parts I 
and II of the cost report, from which the capital expenditure data comes, read “…For cost 
reporting periods beginning on and after October 1, 2001, hospitals receiving 100 percent 
Federal prospective payment for capital are no longer required to complete Parts III and IV of 
this Worksheet…[emphasis added]”  However, after emailing CMS to inquire about the missing 
data, I learned that some paper copies of the instructions included a space between the roman 
numerals, so that those instructions read “hospitals receiving 100 percent Federal prospective 
payment for capital are no longer required to complete Parts I II and IV of this Worksheet…”  It 
seems that this error resulted in the omission of a capital expenditure data for a large number of 
hospitals from 2002-2004.   
System status 
 Data on system status is taken from the AHA hospital database.  In keeping with previous 
research in this area, the sysid variable generated from AHA internal files is used rather than the 
mhsmemb variable determined by a hospital’s response to the AHA annual survey ((Dranove & 
Lindrooth, 2003)).  I include three categories of system membership in the sample—hospitals 
that are members of systems throughout the study period, hospitals that are independent 
throughout the study period and hospitals that are independent then join a hospital system. 
The AHA definition of a hospital system includes single hospital systems.  A 
freestanding hospital can be considered a member of a system if the hospital is closely affiliated 
with three or more other healthcare organization (AHA Guide, 2005).  If system membership 
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enables greater capital expenditures I expect the greatest benefits to accrue to larger systems.  
Relative to very small systems, larger systems may have more savvy financial managers or may 
be better able to reduce transaction costs of borrowing by borrowing larger amounts. I am less 
confident in the ability of small, one or two hospital systems to achieve financing advantages.  
Therefore, I adjust my system membership variable to exclude hospitals in systems containing 
only one or two hospitals.  These hospitals are excluded from the analysis since they are not 
classified as system hospitals but cannot be classified as independent hospitals either.  This 
definition is similar to the one used by the bond rating agency Standard and Poors ((Standard and 
Poors, 2013)).  Whether the effects of system membership differ for one to two hospital systems 
versus larger systems is an opportunity for future research.    
 I used a two-step procedure to identify independent hospitals that joined systems.  First, I 
analyzed data from the AHA annual survey for the years 1996-2009 to identify changes in a 
hospital’s system status.  I identify cases where a hospital was not classified as the member of a 
hospital system, then, in the next year, the hospital was classified as a system member.  This 
yielded a list of 519 transactions in which an independent hospital joined a system.  However, in 
researching some of these transactions I realized that a system membership change did not occur 
as indicated by the AHA data.  To resolve this, I checked for a record of each of the potential 
transactions identified in the annual lists of hospital mergers and acquisitions published by 
Modern Healthcare.  I also checked for a record of the transaction in the Hospital Acquisition 
Reports published by Irving Levin and Associates. If neither the Modern Healthcare lists nor the 
Hospital Acquisition reports contained a record of the transaction, I looked for information about 
the transaction on the hospital’s webpage and for online news coverage of the transaction.  If 
none of these attempts yielded confirmation that the transaction occurred I eliminated the 
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hospital from the sample.  I chose to eliminate the hospital for several reasons.  First, some 
hospitals with unconfirmed transactions clearly listed a system affiliation on their webpages but 
did not offer information about the date on which they joined a system.  In these cases it was 
impossible to assign a system status to each hospital year since only the current system status 
was known.  In other cases, the hospital websites did not contain information about a system 
affiliation.  However, some hospitals with confirmed system affiliation do not prominently 
display their affiliation on their websites so the lack of information about system-affiliation is not 
adequate justification for classifying these hospitals as independent.  Table 4.4 summarizes the 
system status of the sample while Table 4.5 summarizes the number of confirmed acquisitions 
that took place in each year included in the data.   
In addition to dropping hospitals that are members of one or two hospital systems, I also 
drop hospitals that the AHA data suggest have undergone multiple changes in system status and 
hospitals that become independent after having been affiliated with a system.  I do this for two 
reasons.  First, I am not confident the system status data on these hospitals are accurate, 
especially in the case of hospitals with multiple system status changes.  Second, my hypotheses 
are based on the common claim that joining a system enables independent hospitals to make 
greater capital expenditures.  There are no similar claims to guide my expectations about capital 
expenditures among hospitals leaving systems or hospitals with multiple system changes.  My 
results can speak to the effects of independent hospitals joining systems, though dropping cases 
of multiple changes in system membership will certainly limit the generalizability of these 
results. 
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Market measures 
  These include market factors that could affect hospital investment.  From the Area 
Resource File (ARF) I include the median income for the county in which a hospital is located 
and the percent of county residents under 65 without health insurance.  These measures were not 
available for each year and so missing years were assigned the value for the closest neighboring 
non-missing year.  Several other variables were imputed as well.  More information on the 
variables and hospitals affected is available in Table 4.6. 
 Variables capturing the urban or rural nature of a hospital’s market area as well as the 
competition within the hospital’s market were included as well.  Hospital markets were divided 
into three categories using combinations of the Urban-Rural Continuum Codes from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.  The categories are: 
- Markets within metropolitan areas 
- Non-metropolitan markets with a population of over 20,000 or non-metropolitan markets 
with a population of over 2,500 that are also adjacent to a metropolitan area 
- Non-metropolitan markets with populations smaller than 20,000 that are not adjacent to a 
metropolitan area or non-metropolitan markets with a population smaller than 2,500 that 
are adjacent to a metropolitan area. 
  
The level of competition within a market is measured using the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).  This measure is calculated at the hospital level.    
Organizational measures 
 These include the number of beds in the hospital, the hospital’s critical access status, and 
its ownership status (not-for-profit, investor owned or government owned).  In addition, I include 
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a measure of the age of a facility’s assets to create the OldFacility variable -used in model 3 to 
test whether the effects of system membership are greater for hospitals with older facilities.  The 
average age of a hospital’s assets is frequently measured using the age of plant ratio, defined as 
accumulated depreciation divided by depreciation expense.  For changing hospitals I calculate 
the hospital’s average age of plant over the pre-change period.  I use this continuous measure to 
create the binary OldFacility variable used in model 3.  A changing hospital’s value of 
OldFacility is determined based on whether or not a hospitals age of plant is above or below the 
median age of plant for independent hospitals with a BBB rating from Standard and Poors in 
2011. This measure is preferred to the continuous age of plant measure since the effect of 
changes in plant age on capital expenditure probably is not constant, but it is not clear how large 
a change in the age of plant measure is required to signify a substantive change in a hospital’s 
past ability to access capital.  Using information from a bond rating agency allows me to identify 
a value of plant age which is likely to be associated lower bond ratings and barriers to accessing 
capital. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 Table 4.7 lists descriptive statistics for changing hospitals (before and after acquisition) 
as well as permanent independent and system-affiliated hospitals.  These means suggest that 
changing hospitals may experience a significant increase in capital expenditures after joining 
hospital systems.  However, they should be interpreted with caution because capital expenditures 
for all hospitals, including hospitals that were permanent system members or permanently 
independent, rose throughout the study period.  Since most post-change observations come in 
later years of the period while most pre-change observations come in earlier years the rise could 
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simply reflect the increase in capital expenditures that occurred for all hospitals from 1996-2009.  
Surprisingly, acquired hospitals have higher mean capital expenditures in the pre-change period 
than permanent independent hospitals ($56,024 vs. $50,847).  This suggests that independent 
hospitals joining systems may not always be doing so after a period of under-investment and 
financial decline.   
There is little variation in market variables across the four hospital types, except that 
permanent independent hospitals are more likely to be in the small, non-metro areas than any of 
the other hospital types.  The age distribution of acquired hospitals appears to change slightly 
between the pre and post-acquisition periods.  In the pre-acquisition period, 37% of changing 
hospitals fall into the oldest age category compared to 24% of permanent independent hospitals 
and 22% of permanent system hospitals.  In the post-acquisition period only 18% of changing 
hospitals fall into the oldest age category.  Average age of plant seems to improve after a 
changing hospital is acquired, since 75% of changing hospitals fall into the newest age category, 
compared to only 50% of changing hospitals in the pre-period.  This is consistent with the idea 
that system membership enables hospitals to increase their capital expenditures.  Part of this 
increase could come from adding additional beds.  The average number of beds among changing 
hospitals increases from 166 in the pre-acquisition period to 199 in the post-acquisition period. 
 
Capital expenditure timing and trends 
 The critical assumption required by my empirical strategy is that if changing hospitals 
had remained independent, their capital expenditures would have changed in the same way as 
capital expenditures among un-changing hospitals.  It is impossible to test this assumption 
directly since there is no way to observe what would have happened to the acquired hospitals if 
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they had not joined systems.  I can, however, compare capital expenditure trends among control 
hospitals (permanent system and independent hospitals) to pre-change trends in changing 
hospitals.  This comparison is shown in the top panel of Figure 2.  In the period between 1996 
and 2001 capital expenditure trends among all three hospital types are similar.  They diverge 
more in the latter part of the sample, but as the lower panel suggests this may be largely because 
the number of pre-change observations in the last half of the sample is relatively small and so 
averages in these years are less stable.   
It is surprising to see that in many years, “pre-change” hospitals had higher capital 
expenditures than either system or independent hospitals, especially since a larger proportion of 
pre-change hospital observations are in the oldest age category than independent or system-
affiliated hospital observations.  However, these differences disappear in multivariate regressions 
that control for market and organizational characteristics.   
 A second concern about the difference in differences study design is that acquired 
hospitals could delay capital expenditures because they planned to join systems.  Figure 3 shows 
average capital expenditures for changing hospitals in each year, relative to the year the hospital 
was acquired.  The graph does show a small dip in capital expenditures in the year before 
acquisition.  However, the upward trend in capital expenditures in the post-acquisition period 
seems too sustained to be driven entirely by that dip.  The graph clearly shows the cyclical nature 
of capital expenditures, which seem to be relatively constant in the 12 years before acquisition 
but trending upward and exhibiting larger year-to-year variation in the 12 years after acquisition. 
 
 
 
115 
 
Results 
Results for the 3 models described earlier are reported in Table 4.8.  They suggest that system 
membership is associated with a substantial increase in capital expenditure that occurs early in 
the period after acquisition and then diminishes over time.  Estimates from the first specification 
suggest acquired hospitals enjoyed an increase in capital expenditures of $9,459 per bed per year 
for the first five years after system membership began.  This estimate is marginally statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.08).  However, it is an 18.6% increase relative to mean capital spending 
of $50,847 per bed annually for permanent independent hospitals.   This increase in capital 
expenditure does not appear to continue after the first five years of system membership.  In all 
three specifications the change in capital expenditures after six years is statistically insignificant 
and in most cases it is negative. However, the estimates for capital expenditure changes six or 
more years after acquisition may not reflect the true long-term impact of system membership on 
capital expenditure.  Only 133 of the acquired hospitals in the sample joined systems early 
enough to be observed six or more years after acquisition and so the estimate of long-term effects 
of system membership are made using a relatively small number of observations.  Moreover, 
these hospitals may experience a period of low capital expenditures following above average 
expenditures in the first five years after system membership begins simply because capital 
expenditure is cyclical. 
 The second specification suggests that a large increase in capital expenditure ($12,110 
per bed) occurs within the first year a hospital joins a system.  The increase is practically large 
but only marginally statistically significant.  The fact that capital expenditures increase soon after 
acquisition suggests systems supply acquired hospitals with capital directly, rather than working 
to gradually improve an acquired hospital’s profitability until the hospital is able to attract 
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financing on its own merit or to fund capital expenditures with newly generated internal capital.  
None of the other post acquisition periods are associated with a statistically significant change in 
capital expenditures, but this is not surprising given the data limitations.  The number of 
observations used to estimate the effect in each two-year period is relatively small since these 
estimates are based on a fraction of the total number of observations.  These estimates are also 
more affected by variation in hospital and system-specific decisions about when exactly to make 
changes in capital expenditures.  Both factors are likely responsible for the large standard errors 
associated with the estimates for each post-acquisition two year block of time. 
 The last model allows the effect of system membership to differ based on the age of a 
hospital’s assets.  My hypothesis was that older hospitals are more likely to pursue system 
membership as a way to increase their capital expenditures.  The results do not lend support for 
this hypothesis.  In fact, the estimated increase in capital expenditures is actually larger for 
hospitals with newer assets than for hospitals with older assets.   In the first five years after 
system membership begins, acquired hospitals with newer assets enjoy a $12,383 per year 
increase in annual capital expenditures per bed while the estimated increase in capital 
expenditures for older hospitals is $6,405 lower.  There is not sufficient evidence to say with 
statistical confidence that the there is a difference between the effect for old and new hospitals 
(the p-value on the interaction term is 0.56).  However, the marginal effect of system 
membership for a new hospital is significant at the 0.05 level while the p-value for the marginal 
effect of system membership for an old hospital is 0.50, suggesting that the increase in capital 
expenditures associated with system membership is not driven primarily by large increases for 
older hospitals. 
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Discussion 
This study finds that, on average, independent hospitals that join systems do experience 
increases in capital expenditures.  This is consistent with the idea that system membership can 
improve access to capital for acquired hospitals.  However, these results present additional 
questions.  The increase in capital expenditures associated with system membership suggests that 
independent hospitals may be subject to financial market frictions that increase the returns 
required by debt markets and banks.  Little is known about what these frictions are and how 
system membership helps to overcome them.  It is possible that systems may play a “venture 
capital” role for independent hospitals by providing expertise and monitoring of investments that 
debt markets or banks cannot.  These functions may reduce the risk involved in capital 
investments and as a result the cost of capital as well.  Even not-for-profit systems without 
access to equity markets could play this role so long as the system had adequate internal capital 
to fund investments in acquired facilities.  However, it is also possible that increases are driven 
by the creation of new investment opportunities that system membership creates rather than by 
changes in access to capital.  These investments could include new service lines enabled by 
system-provided clinical expertise.  A third possibility is that increases in capital expenditure do 
not occur because system membership overcomes financial market imperfections that plague 
independent hospitals.  Rather, the increase in capital expenditures among acquired hospitals 
occurs because of expenses required to integrate the acquired hospital into the systems.  These 
could include costs related to moving an acquired hospital from its existing software systems to 
the software used by the rest of the acquiring system.  Another cost of integration could be 
changes in signage required after the acquisition.  These costs of integration are potentially very 
great, but the benefits they provide to the acquired hospital’s community would be minimal.  
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Further research is needed to distinguish between these possibilities and to determine the 
financial and operational mechanisms responsible for capital expenditure increases.   
On average, acquired hospitals experience an increase in capital expenditures.  However, the 
results suggest that capital expenditure increases are largest for hospitals with relatively new 
assets though these hospitals presumably have a smaller need for basic maintenance than older 
hospitals.  This is an interesting finding that deserves additional research.  What is it about older 
hospitals that leads systems to make smaller investments in them?  Perhaps systems that acquire 
older hospitals improve operations in these hospitals before making capital investments.  
Alternatively, older and newer hospitals may be differentiated by their investment opportunities. 
Older hospitals may be more likely to be located in areas with low growth and more indigent 
care and as a result they may have fewer profitable investment opportunities available.  Older 
hospitals could also have fewer investment opportunities if they are competing with financially 
stable hospitals able to respond quickly to new investment opportunities and seize first-mover 
advantage.  If older hospitals do have fewer profitable investment opportunities then their 
inability to attract capital may be a sign that (at least for these hospitals) capital markets are 
operating efficiently, rather than a sign that these hospitals are subject to capital market 
imperfections.   
It is important to acknowledge that this study found differences in capital expenditure 
changes between older and newer hospitals that are economically large but not statistically 
significant.  This could result from the high variance of capital expenditures and the fact that 
estimating the difference in the effects on old and new hospitals required splitting an already 
small sample of acquired hospitals.  Repeating this analysis using a larger sample of acquired 
hospitals would be telling.  Unfortunately limited available data makes identifying acquired 
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hospitals a challenge and it is likely that the data include most of the independent hospitals that 
joined systems between 1996 and 2009.   
 
Conclusion 
 Hospital managers and board members weighing the costs and benefits of joining a 
multihospital system should be encouraged that on average multihospital system membership is 
associated with an increase in capital expenditures.  They should also understand that system 
membership provides greater capital expenditure benefits to some hospitals than others.  
However, a better understanding of why these increases occur and the kinds of hospitals are 
likely to enjoy the greatest increases would provide much needed guidance to hospital 
administrators.  Future research should also examine what kinds of purchases hospitals are 
making after they join systems to determine whether the observed increases in capital 
expenditures will lead to a benefit to the community, or simply the reflect cost of integrating an 
acquired hospital into a larger system.   
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Tables  
Table 4.1: Sample derivation       
  
Changes in system 
status All hospitals 
  Hospitals 
Hospital 
years Hospitals 
Hospital 
years 
US General acute care 
hospitals* 
576 7,555  5,095  63,132  
Couldn't be matched 
to MCR 
519 6,899  4,616  58,887  
Had multiple system 
status changes 
519 6,899  3,834  49,017  
Dropping unconfirmed 
acquisitions 
219 2,906  3,534  45,024  
After deleting 
missing/unrealistic 
data 
203 2,188  3,438  34,838  
*Excludes military and federal hospitals as well as hospitals with 
multiple system status changes 
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Rule Hospitals affected 
(changing)
Observations lost 
(changing hospitals)
Hospitals 
affected (all)
Observations 
lost (all 
hospitals)
Total sample
Outcome variable
Capital expenditures non-missing and
> 0
189 398 2851 6423
Capital expenditures per 
bed
< $3 million per bed 0 0 15 18
Operating vairables
Depreciation expense > 0 and non-missing 10 13 235 426
Accumulated depreciation > 0 and non-missing 6 7 129 135
Net fixed assets >=0 and non-missing 1 1 12 15
Operating expense > 0 and non-missing 0 0 8 13
Operating expense per bed Within 4x IQR* 5 7 67 194
Financial variables
Return on assets
(net income/total assets)
<p75+x4IQR
>p25-4IQR**
and non-missing
42 60 637 1162
Total assets > 0 10 22 153 591
LT Liabilities/Total assets <p75+x4IQR* 1 1 90 208
Cash not equal to zero and 
non-missing
11 13 183 409
Investments > 0 > or equal to zero and 
non-missing
8 14 64 108
Days cash on hand 
(inv+cash)/opex
<p75+4IQR* 2 4 103 306
------ Hospital must be 
observed before and 
after acquisition
16 178 16 178
Final Sample                                203                              2,188                 3,438                    34,838 
*This denotes a rule stating that all observations must be less than than 75th percentile plus 4 times the interquartile range
**This denotes a rule stating that all observations must be either 1) less than the 75th percentile plus 4 times the 
interquartile range or 2) greater than the 25th percentile less 4 times the interquartile range
Table 4.2- Rules to define erroneous data and their effect on the sample
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Table 4.3:  Missing capital 
expenditure data by year 
Year Frequency Percent 
1996 4 0.05 
1997 6 0.08 
1998 6 0.08 
1999 8 0.1 
2000 9 0.11 
2001 17 0.21 
2002 2,272 28.6 
2003 3,360 42.3 
2004 1,500 18.88 
2005 192 2.42 
2006 155 1.95 
2007 147 1.85 
2008 138 1.74 
2009 130 1.64 
Total 7,944 100 
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Table 4.4: Sample by system-affiliation 
System membership Hospitals Hospital Years 
Permanent system 
                
1,589  
                
15,458  
Permanent independent 
                
1,646  
                
17,192  
Independent hospital joining 
system (hospital year before 
change) 
                   
203  
                      
938  
Independent hospital joining 
system (hospital year after 
change) 
                   
203  
                  
1,250  
Total 
                
3,438  
                
34,838  
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Table 4.5: System-status changes by 
year 
Year Frequency Percent 
1997 17 8.37 
1998 39 19.21 
1999 22 10.84 
2000 16 7.88 
2001 26 12.81 
2002 7 3.45 
2003 6 2.96 
2004 11 5.42 
2005 10 4.93 
2006 12 5.91 
2007 13 6.4 
2008 11 5.42 
2009 13 6.4 
Total 203 100 
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Variable Change Description
Hospitals 
affected 
(changing)
Observations 
changed 
(changing 
hospitals)
Hospitals 
affected (all)
Observations 
changed 
(all hospitals)
Hospital beds Impute missing values from 
next year
                         8                         13                     149                        241 
Median income (in $10) Impute missing values from 
closest neighboring year
                    219                   1,439                 4,215                  27,190 
Percent of county younger 
than 65 wihtout insurance
Impute missing values from 
closest neighboring year
                    219                   2,307                 4,258                  43,308 
Accumulated depr Observations for which 
accum. depr is zero were 
imputed as the previous 
year's AD + the current year's 
depreciation expense
                       53                       138                     853                    2,903 
Age of plant Impute as average of 
previous and next year if age 
is missing or depreciation 
expense is zero.  (Up to 3 
consecutive missing years 
imputed)
                    178                       449                 2,913                    7,208 
Long-Term Liabilities Assume negative values of 
LTD should be positive
                       23                         61                     424                    1,933 
Cash Assume negative values of 
cash should be positive
                       93                       395                 1,509                    6,221 
Plant age
(Accumulated depr) / 
(depreciation expense)
define categories and base 
these on bond rating -
categories:
ageAA= age <9
ageA = 9<age<10.3
ageBBB = 10.3<age<11
agejunk = age>11 (including 
cases where depr = 0) 0 0 0 0
Table 4.6: Imputation and other changes to explanatory variables
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Table 4.7- Descriptive statistics by system type 
  
Pre-
Change 
(n=938) 
Post-Change 
(n=1250) 
Permanent 
Independent 
(n=15,458) 
Permanent 
System 
Members 
(n=17,192) 
Capital expenditures  
Capex per bed*      56,024                  67,647              50,847          55,440  
    (63,411)             (154,372)      (96,643)     (122,528) 
Operating factors         
Hospital beds           166.                       199.                 135.                197.   
         (127)                     (170)               (146)             (191) 
Critical access         0.04.                       0.10.                0.21.                 0.10.  
         (0.18)                    (0.30)             (0.41)            (0.30) 
Age category (AA)         0.50.                       0.75.                0.65.               0.70.  
         (0.50)                    (0.43)             (0.48)            (0.46) 
Age category (A)         0.07.                       0.05.                0.07.               0.06. 
         (0.26)                    (0.22)             (0.26)            (0.24) 
Age category (BBB)         0.05.                       0.02.                0.03              0.03.  
         (0.22)                    (0.15)              (0.18)           (0.17) 
Age category (junk)         0.37.                       0.18.                 0.24               0.22. 
         (0.48)                    (0.38)              (0.43)            (0.41) 
Investor owned         0.05.                       0.21.                0.04.               0.26.  
         (0.21)                   (0.40)               (0.18)              (0.44) 
Government owned         0.16.                       0.07.                  0.41.                 0.11.  
         (0.37)                    (0.25)               (0.49)              (0.31) 
Not for profit         0.79.                      0.72.                  0.55.                 0.63.  
         (0.41)                    (0.45)               (0.50)              (0.48) 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
*Note: Inflation adjusted using PPI for General Medical/Surgical Hospitals 
  
127 
 
 
 
1 2 3
After change- yrs 0-1 12,110
(7,284)          
0.10
After change- yrs 2-3 -1,322
(5,295)          
0.80
After change- yrs 4-5 19,264
(16,243)       
0.24
After change- yrs 0-5 9,459 12,383
(5,443)          (6,173)          
0.08 0.05
After change- yrs 6+ -5,018 -4,987 5,935
(5,992)          (5,990)          (11,024)       
0.40 0.41 0.59
Old facility 2,903
(4,642)          
0.53
Old facility*After change 0-5 -6,405
(10,922)       
0.56
Old facility*After change 6+ -20,007
(12,724)       
0.11
System -133 -130 998
(2,474)          (2,473)          (2,715)          
0.96 0.96 0.71
Independent 1,318 1,319 2,421
(2,427)          (2,427)          (2,700)          
0.59 0.54 0.37
Constant 2,902 2,799 2,224
(26,781)       (26,511)       (26,717)       
0.11 0.11 0.93
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
State fixed effects yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes
Table 4.8: Changes in capital expenditures associated with system 
status changes
Note: Cells show the estimated coefficient, the se (in parentheses) 
& the p-value.  Estimates are from model 1.
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 4.1- Capital expenditures for all hospitals 
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Figure 4.2- Capital expenditures per bed per year 
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Figure 4.3- Mean capital expenditures by year (relative to acquisition year) 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 Hospital industry professionals and the trade press often claim multihospital system 
membership improves access to capital for independent hospitals acquired by these systems.  
However, neither anecdotal reports nor academic research explain how improvements in access 
to capital could occur.  Moreover, there is little evidence available to support or refute this claim.  
Much of the research that does examine the relationship between system membership and access 
to capital uses data that predate important changes in the hospital industry, changes that 
drastically altered the way hospitals manage their finances.  This dissertation begins to fill those 
gaps in the literature by proposing and testing specific theories about how system membership 
could affect hospitals’ access to internal and external sources of capital.  The dissertation also 
includes a study of changes in acquired hospitals’ capital investment behavior since investment 
behavior is an outcome affected by changes in access to capital.  Specifically, the three questions 
this dissertation addresses are: 
1. Does system membership enable not-for-profit hospitals to reduce the amount of cash 
they hold in reserve? 
2. What are the effects of system membership on hospital leverage?  Does system 
membership allow low-leverage not-for-profit hospitals to increase their leverage?  Are 
highly-levered not-for-profit hospitals affected and if so how? 
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3. Does system membership enable acquired hospitals to increase their capital expenditures?  
When do these changes occur relative to acquisition?  Are they immediate as we would 
expect if hospital systems made capital available to acquired hospitals, or do they take 
longer to develop, as we would expect if system membership caused operational 
improvements which in turn improved a hospital’s creditworthiness or internal capital 
generation gradually? 
 
Chapter II examines the effects of system membership on the availability of internal capital.  
This chapter furthers our understanding of the relationship between system membership and 
access to capital by proposing a mechanism through which system membership may make 
additional internal capital available to acquired hospitals.  The paper notes that relative to 
hospital systems, independent hospitals have high costs of a cash shortfall resulting from their 
limited access to external capital, their higher probability of bankruptcy and their relatively high 
costs of bankruptcy.  In theory these factors contribute to independent NFP hospitals’ high cash 
balances and, because system membership affects these factors, system membership should 
reduce NFP hospitals’ optimal cash balances thus “freeing up” cash reserves to fund capital 
investment.   
Overall, the results in Chapter II do not support the idea that system membership 
meaningfully increases the internal capital available for investment.  In reality, the percent of 
acquired hospitals with large cash reserves is similar to the percent of all independent hospitals 
with large cash reserves.  Even if system membership does offer hospitals a chance to reduce 
cash reserves, a relatively small portion of acquired hospitals have sizeable reserves to reduce.  
There are many reasons independent hospitals may choose to join multihospital systems (Ault, 
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Childs, Wainright, & Young, 2011) and it appears that the desire to gain access to internal capital 
to fund investments is not a prominent one.  This is a notable difference between the NFP and 
investor-owned sectors since investor owned firms with high cash holdings frequently become 
the target of takeover attempts. 
The second portion of this paper examines whether acquired hospitals that did have relatively 
large cash holdings experienced reductions in these reserves after joining systems.  Given the 
fact that relatively few hospitals in the sample of acquired hospitals have unusually large cash 
holdings to begin with, the sample of hospitals that could be expected to reduce their cash 
holdings was small.  A very small sample size resulted in estimates with large standard errors 
and no statistical significance.  The results cast doubt on the hypothesis that system membership 
reduces acquired hospitals’ cash balances by a meaningful amount.  For acquired hospitals’ cash 
balances to be equivalent to the average system-affiliated hospital’s cash holdings, the actual 
declines in cash balances would have to be much greater than the effects estimated in this paper.  
However, this study only included a two-year follow-up period and it is possible large changes in 
cash balances take longer than two years to develop.  
Chapter III examines the effects of system membership on another source of capital—debt.  
Like the first paper this one adds to the literature on system membership and access to capital by 
identifying a specific mechanism through which system membership could improve independent 
hospitals’ access to capital.  This paper uses finance theory to identify factors that may make 
debt issuance either unattainable or unusually expensive for independent hospitals relative to 
hospitals affiliated with multihospital systems.  These factors include a lack of financial 
expertise, high proportional transactions costs of borrowing and a binding project-financing 
constraint.   The results indicate that low-leverage acquired hospitals (which are most likely to be 
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encountering barriers to increasing leverage) experience statistically significant and substantively 
large increases in leverage after joining multihospital systems.  The results do not suggest 
leverage changes for highly-levered acquired hospitals.   However, interpreting this result is 
challenging.  The study could have failed to find an effect because none is actually present.  
Alternatively, system membership could help some highly-levered hospitals reduce their 
leverage towards a lower optimum, while other highly-levered hospitals could have taken on 
additional debt as a means of funding further investment.  If both these effects are present the net 
effect could be small.   
The first two studies propose and test specific theories explaining how system membership 
could improve access to capital for acquired hospitals.  The third study does not specify a 
particular mechanism through which system membership could improve access to capital.  
Rather, it looks at an outcome influenced by changes in hospitals’ access to capital---investment 
behavior.  If hospitals have profitable investment opportunities they are unable to fund because 
they lack access to capital, and if system membership improves access to capital, acquired 
hospitals should increase their level of capital expenditures after joining multihospital systems.  
This study finds evidence that capital investment increases for acquired hospitals after they join 
systems.  Moreover, these increases occur early in the first five years after acquisition.  Quick 
increases in capital expenditures are consistent with the idea that system membership improves 
access to capital directly, rather than indirectly by improving hospital operations which then 
improve hospitals’ creditworthiness or internal capital generation.  Surprisingly, the biggest 
increases in capital expenditures occurred for the hospitals with the newest physical plants.  This 
could indicate that systems are most willing to fund capital expenditures for hospitals that lack 
access to capital because of plentiful investment opportunities rather than for other reasons. 
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These three papers provide complimentary insights into the effects of system membership 
on hospital access to capital.  Alone, the finding that system membership increases capital 
investment does not necessarily suggest access to capital has improved.  Increases in capital 
investment would occur, even without changes in access to capital, if system membership creates 
new investment opportunities for acquired hospitals that were more profitable than existing 
opportunities or if increases in capital expenditures reflect integration costs.  Similarly, even 
without changes in access to capital, leverage could increase for some hospitals that join systems 
if these hospitals were allocated a portion of the system’s overall debt holdings.  The joint 
finding that both capital investment and leverage increase for some acquired hospitals is stronger 
evidence that system membership does in fact improve access to capital.  However, further 
research is warranted to determine how many acquired hospitals experience improvements in 
access to capital, how these improvements occur, and what factors drive changes in leverage. For 
instance, Chapter III’s results, which suggest system membership allows low-leverage hospitals 
to increase their leverage, does not offer information about how these changes in leverage came 
about or how much of the additional leverage was used to fund capital expenditures.  Rather than 
enabling new capital investment, additional debt could have been issued to preserve cash 
holdings for investment in financial securities.  Future research could distinguish between these 
two possibilities by examining changes in net fixed assets for the group of acquired hospitals that 
enjoyed increases in leverage.  If hospitals increased both leverage and net fixed assets this 
would be strong evidence that increased debt market access was going to fund capital 
investment.  Alternatively, if hospitals that increased leverage failed to increase fixed assets it is 
more likely that debt issuance was funding indirect arbitrage or that hospitals in systems were 
simply being reporting a system-average leverage.   
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Similarly, further research on the factors that caused the capital investment increases 
observed in Chapter IV, would be useful.  Were these increases funded by changes in leverage or 
were they funded in other ways?  More detail about the kinds of projects that made up these 
increases would also be interesting.  The increased capital expenditures could have been caused 
by investments that promise a substantial benefit to the acquired hospital’s community, like 
service line expansions or new technology to improve the quality of care.  Alternatively, these 
investments could simply represent the costs of integrating the acquired hospital into a larger 
system.  Future research could use AHA data on service offerings as a way to better-understand 
what kinds of investments made up the increases in capital expenditures. 
Because each of the three dissertation papers uses a similar sample of hospitals, there is an 
opportunity to combine the results from each study to produce “back of the envelope” 
conclusions about how capital expenditure increases are funded and the outcomes associated 
with changes in internal and external capital.  Of the 203 confirmed hospital acquisitions, 51% 
(104) of these hospitals fell into the sub-group of hospitals for which increases in capital 
expenditures were estimated to be the largest (this sub-group was hospitals with relatively new 
assets).  It is interesting to note that only half of acquired hospitals fall into the group with the 
largest increases in capital expenditures.  This reinforces the idea that many acquisitions may 
occur for reasons unrelated to access to capital. 
 Of the 104 hospitals in the sub-group that experienced the largest increases in capital 
expenditures, 11 were also in the group that Chapter II identified as increasing leverage after 
joining systems.  This suggests that even though increases in leverage could be funding increases 
in capital expenditures for some hospitals, many of the hospitals with increases in capital 
expenditures do not appear to be funding those investments by issuing additional debt.  There is 
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also uncertainty about how hospitals that increased their leverage used those increases.  Of the 20 
hospitals in the “low leverage” group that experienced increases in leverage, only 11 were also in 
the group found to enjoy the greatest increases in capital.  The results from Chapter II also 
highlight the need for future research describing how increases in capital expenditures are 
funded.  Of the 104 hospitals in the sub-group of hospitals with the largest capital expenditures, 
only 10 were also in the group of hospitals with the largest estimated reductions in cash.  
Reductions in cash holdings do not appear to be funding much of the capital expenditure made 
by acquired hospitals.   
These are, admittedly, rough estimates.  They are based on mean changes in financial 
outcomes for groups of hospitals, rather than changes in outcomes for individual hospitals.  This 
method of synthesizing the results from each of the three dissertation has flaws.  For instance, it 
is quite possible that some hospitals in the group that experienced increases in leverage, but did 
not have the largest increases in capital expenditures, still experienced some increases in capital 
expenditures after joining systems.  Still, these estimates make it clear that further research is 
needed to identify the characteristics of system membership that cause changes in capital 
expenditures and the reasons for the observed increases in leverage for some hospitals.   
Rigorous research on the relationship between system membership and access to capital 
is extremely scarce.  These dissertation papers do much to advance the literature in this area by 
offering evidence that system membership does increase leverage and capital expenditures, at 
least for some groups of hospitals.  However, quantitative research to answer detailed questions 
about how changes in capital expenditure are funded and what drives changes in leverage would 
require detailed, accurate data and a large sample of acquired hospitals.  Unfortunately, sample 
sizes were relatively small for each of the three dissertation papers and identifying a large sample 
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of independent hospitals acquired by systems in recent years is not possible.    Pursuing this 
question further may require qualitative research methods.  Despite the fact that much of what 
we know about hospital finance comes from quantitative research, qualitative methods have a 
great deal to contribute to the field.  Methods like structured interviews of health finance 
professionals and case studies could offer a richer understanding of the mechanisms through 
which system membership affects access to capital.  Hospital financial data are plagued by a 
number of shortcomings including questions about the accuracy of Medicare Cost Report 
information, large numbers of missing and unrealistic data values, and the endogeneity of 
financial variables in general.  Moreover, concepts like “the cost of capital”, “the optimal level of 
cash holdings” or “optimal capital structure” can be difficult to define conceptually and even 
harder to observe in data.   Qualitative methods would be less affected by these problems than 
traditional quantitative methods. 
 The idea that hospital systems may affect acquired hospitals’ access to capital also raises 
interesting questions about whether hospital systems create and maintain internal capital markets 
to actively control the allocation of capital to system affiliates.  Health systems are not 
homogeneous and vary on the degree to which control is centralized. (Bazzoli, Shortell, Dubbs, 
Chan, & Kralovec, 1999; Dubbs, Bazzoli, Shortell, & Kralovec, 2004)  This suggests some 
systems may have active internal capital markets even if others do not.  At least one health 
system appears to maintain actively managed internal capital markets (Robinson & Dratler, 
2006) but virtually nothing is known about how many systems maintain these markets, whether 
there are features common to all markets and whether features of these markets differ for 
different types of systems (large vs. small, geographically diverse vs. local, not-for-profit vs. 
investor-owned). 
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 If many hospital systems do actively manage internal capital allocation it begs the 
question, are these systems better at allocating capital than traditional lenders?  If so hospital 
systems may play an important role in improving the efficiency of capital allocation.  The 
finance literature does not offer a consistent answer to the question of whether or not internal 
capital markets improve capital allocation among investor-owned firms.  Some theoretical work 
suggests these markets can improve investment efficiency (Gertner, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1994) 
while other research suggests this may not be the case (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000).  Empirical 
evidence from investor-owned firms is difficult to find because financial statements for divisions 
of conglomerate companies are not publicly reported.  For all its limitations, hospital data may 
have a unique contribution to make to the finance field since hospital data it is sometimes 
available at both the facility and the system level.  However, before larger questions about the 
effects of internal capital markets on investment efficiency can be answered, basic descriptive 
research is required to confirm that hospital systems are maintaining internal capital markets and 
to describe the structure and processes of these markets.  Qualitative research could make an 
important contribution to this effort by helping to identify and classify common characteristics of 
internal capital markets. 
 The first two papers of this dissertation identify financial market imperfections that may 
inhibit independent hospitals’ ability to access capital markets.  This adds evidence to a body of 
literature that suggests hospitals face capital market imperfections that affect their ability to 
make capital investments. (K. L. Reiter, 2004; K. L. Reiter & Song, 2011)  This literature has 
consistently stressed that, because of these imperfections, hospitals are not always able to find 
financing for value-creating investment projects.  Instead, some hospitals face tradeoffs between 
using cash holdings to fund current investment projects and retaining these holdings to insure 
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future debt market access.  (Rivenson, Reiter, Wheeler, & Smith, 2011; Smith, Wheeler, 
Rivenson, & Reiter, 2000; Song & Reiter, 2010)  Similarly, NFP hospitals, because they have 
limited access to equity, face a choice between passing up investment opportunities or increasing 
leverage and limiting their future access to debt capital.  (Wheeler, Smith, Rivenson, & Reiter, 
2000)  However, the net present value tools most hospitals use to evaluate investment 
opportunities (K. L. Reiter, Smith, Wheeler, & Rivenson, 2000) do not take into account the 
limitations in future debt market access that many hospitals must accept when they choose to use 
cash or debt to fund investment.  Hospital managers and boards can be guided by net present 
value analysis but ultimately they lack analytical tools that can help them decide whether an 
investment opportunity creates enough value to sacrifice future access to debt markets or internal 
capital.  Devising criteria managers can use to analyze investment opportunities that take into 
account the loss of future access to capital costs is a formidable task that may require the use of 
complex theory for valuing real options.  Still, such criteria have the potential to vastly improve 
investment decision making by hospitals and so developing these tools is a worthwhile endeavor. 
Finally, the discussion of NFP hospitals’ cost of capital in Chapter III raises questions about 
how NFP hospitals’ equity holders’ expected returns vary for system vs. independent hospitals, 
and who the equity holders for system-affiliated hospitals are.  Traditionally the community in 
which a not-for-profit hospital is located is considered the hospital’s residual claimant.  But little 
is known about how this relationship changes as NFP hospitals join systems that may span 
multiple states or regions of the country.  In this case who are the system’s equity holders and 
who receives the dividends-in-kind provided by the hospital?  Do these benefits flow to 
communities most in need of services or do system-affiliated hospitals that generate funding for 
community benefit spend that funding in their local communities?  Additional research 
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examining this question could help inform independent hospital managers and boards 
considering joining multihospital systems. 
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